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Introduction
When in December of 1978, President Carter announced
his decision to give the one-year notice terminating the
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China
(Taiwan),l he precipitated a constitutional debate of
considerable importance. At issue was whether the Presi-
dent acted properly in terminating the treaty on his
own initiative. More sharply than any similar debate in
recent years, the discussion brought into focus the entire-
ly different and conflicting approaches that have tended
to dominate discourse between the Executive. and Congress
concerning their respective constitutional responsibilities
for foreign policy. The debate pointedly demonstrated
the lack of intellectual imagination in both approaches.
Unhappily, the quality of the debate did not improve
when the question entered the courts under tha aegis of
Senator Goldwater's suit against the President. 2 The
matter reached the Supreme Court. The Court escaped by
dismissing the case as non-justiciable. 3 While several
Justices used the occasion to carve out interesting, even
novel positions on peripheral issues of standing and
political question, the chief virtue of the order was
aborting the Court of Appeals' unfortunate opinion dis-
missing the Senator's suit on the merits. Since it is with
the merits of the questions that we are concerned, the
Circuit Court opinion and the District Court decision
holding that President Carter had violated the Constitution
are the focus of this article.
• Professor of Law, University of Miami, School of Law
1. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Republic of China, art. X, Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S.
No. 3178, 248 U.N.T.S. 213. [Treaty hereinafter cited as Mutual Defense
Treaty].
2. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979); rev'd. per
cw-riw, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979)" vacated as nonjusticiable 100 S.Ct
533 (1979) (mem.)
3. Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979).
4. Id. Statement of Mr. Justice Rehnquist (political question);
Statement of Mr. Justice Powell (case not "ripe" for judicial review).
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The first approach to the allocation of foreign
affairs powers, characteristic of the terms in which
Congress tends to conduct its side of the discourse is
exemplified by Judge Gasch's District Court opiniont
and Judge MacKinnon's appeals court dissent.6 Both
opinions tended to be narrowly literal and too simple.
At the core of their argument stood the supremacy clause
and the apparent parallel, under the clause, between
statutes and treaties. 7 Statutes, they noted, could be
repealed only by legislative action. The same, there-
fore, must be true of treaties. The argument was seen
through an all-or-nothing perspective. But treaties differ
from statutes. Though both are sources of domestic law,
treaties are international compacts as well. If, on
occasion, terminating a treaty is very much like repeal-
ing a statute, it does not follow that aZZ terminations
can be so analogized. Neither does the supremacy clause
pretend to define or control all the forms of law-making
in which the government might engage. The simplistic all-
or-nothing argument conflicts with the historical record
and with the possibility that the President may indeed
have the right to terminate treaties under a variety of
circumstances and without congressional or senatorial
concurrence.8
This, of course, is not to suggest that the supre-
macy clause was irrelevant. The defect lay rather in the
failure to go deeper, a failure which left both Judges
Gasch and McKinnon vulnerable to attack by the Court of
Appeals majority and unable to exploit the analytic
fallacies upon which the latter's decision was built.
Moreover, neither Judge was able adequately to formulate
the legal significance of the distinctions that exist
between the historical record and President Carter's
action. Neither was able to dramatize the unprecedented
and unwarranted nature of the power claimed by that
action.
5. Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979)
6. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Mac-
Kinnon, J., dissenting).
7. The supremacy clause states as follows: This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties which shall be made under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land ... U.S.
Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. See Part V infra.
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While Judges Gasch and MacKinnon demonstrate that
one cannot approach important questions of this sort
through a narrow literal reading of the Constitution,
the Court of Appeals majority demonstrates the positive
dangers of what can be called the "rhetorical approach."
This approach has dominated the executive side of the
discourse and, in fact, commanded a much wider allegiance
until it stumbled badly in the aftermath of Vietnam.
The argument is a familiar one: foreign policy is
uniquely presidential business. Politicians say it is
so and foreign governments behave as though it were so.
Presidents usually act accordingly. We generally expect
them to act that way and hold them accountable for the
results. Only as the constitutional text renders its in-
trusion unavoidable do we concede a place to Congress in
this otherwise executive sphere. In somewhat more sophis-
ticated terms it is said that the formulation and execution
of foreign policy are for the President alone, except as he
needs domestic legislation or money or finds it expedient
to make a treaty, obtqin a formal declaration of war or seek
congressional advice. Within such a framework, termination
of the Mutual Defense Treaty was solely a presidential mat-
ter.
This position is rarely supported by any serious
constitutional analysis. Its adherents appear to believe
that its repeated assertion, bolstered by a few arguments
from expediency and an appeal to follow the practice of
other nations, will make its truth self-evident. When
pressed for a supporting constitutional reference the "exe-
cutive power" clause is usually invoked.1 0
9. Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the Comittee on Foreign
Relations on S. Res. 45, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 285 (1979) (statement
of William D. Rogers).
10. The executive power clause provides: "The executive power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." If
construed as an affirmative grant of power, the clause contains no defi-
nition of the power being disposed of. It is something called the "exe-
cutive power," but one must look elsewhere, perhaps to history or other
models, for what that might include. Hamilton, of course, is the name
most closely associated with the idea that the executive power clause
was an affirmative grant to the President of all powers, not granted
elsewhere, that were "by their nature" executive. This included all
powers specifically enumerated in Article II plus those flowing "from
the general grant, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the
Constitution, and with the principles of government." Hamilton (Paci-
ficus), in E.S. Corwin, The President's Control of Foreign Relations at
11 (1917 & reprint 1970). As to "principles of government," it might be
thought that Hamilton was drawing mostly upon the model of the 18th
century British monarch. For a more contemporary expression of the
Hamiltonian view see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) dis-
cussed infra at note 79 and accompanying text.
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Since that clause does not define the "executive" power
which it is supposed to confer upon the President, how-
ever, the argument lapses into a rhetorical mode: foreign
policy is an "inherently" executive function because it
is so.
As with the supremacy clause argument, there is
just enough in this last assertion to lend it cred-
ibility. The President does indeed play a more dominant
role in the formulation of foreign policy than he norm-
ally plays in domestic matters.1 l But this point should
begin, not, as the "inherent" theorists would have it,
end the analysis. It is necessary (1) to understand
the textual sources of the President's commanding role
and the limitations upon that role inherent in those
sources; (2) to fashion a theory explaining the relation-
ship of those sources to the other parts of the document;
and (3) to explore the several facets of the President's
role and determine how the scope of the power implicit
in each facet is to be fixed under the dictates of the
separation of powers doctrine and other postulates that
lie "behind the words of the Constitution" and serve to
"limit and control." 1 2
Since none of this is part of the "inherent powers"
theory, its application to the Goldwater case yielded a
predictable outcome: the President won. More important
than the winning -- which was short lived -- was the
manner of the victory, which we may hope carries a per-
manent lesson. Throughout its opinion, the Court of
Appeals was uneasy with the "inherent powers" approach.
The opinion valiantly searches for a sounder foundation
upon which to base a decision in favor of the President.
Yet it only succeeds in producing an opinion permeated
by analytic confusion, textual contradictions, and a com-
plete repudiation of the separation of powers doctrine
as that doctrine has come to be understood in contempor-
ary decisions. The Court of Appeals opinion stands as evi-
dence of how any effort to translate the practical fact of
presidential leadership into a constitutional rule of
self-sufficient presidential power depends upon rhetoric
and rhetoric alone.
In the end, of course, the exponents of this approach,
including the Court of Appeals, may actually be working
at another level. Out of a deeper concern for efficacy
11. See Part I infra.
12. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
322 (1934).
[VOL. 6
POWER TO TERMINATE TREATIES
in the conduct of foreign policy, they may be con-
founding the constitutional question with the merits of
the President's policy and using the rhetorical approach
to secure that result. Perhaps they worry lest the
trends apparent in the aftermath of the Vietnam and
Watergate tragedies leave the nation impotent to meet
the challenges of a hostile world; that the pendulum
has swung too far against the President. Perhaps they
also look at Congress and worry lest the chaos, the de-
lays, the cultural myopia, and the heavy-handed style
of American congressional politics compromise the effect-
ive conduct of delicate relations with other governments.
This kind of thinking, however, falls victim to
its own premises. It echoes the widespread tendency
to decry the instrusion of legal technicalities into
the great affairs of state. But in the constitutional
sphere at least, great affairs are rarely understood a-
part from legal technicalities. In our case the failure
to make careful distinctions, to attend to the constitu-
tional text, to refine concepts, and probe the cases on
the grounds of a broader concern for governmental
efficacy only masks the fact that efficacy is not genuine-
ly at issue in this debate. Our democratic values are
at stake. But that becomes apparent only after the
legal analysis is done and both the rhetorical and literal
approaches discarded. Only then can it be seen that
complete vindication of the President's position would
not only have arrested the pendulum but turned it back to
whence it started. One can, of course, wish that the
Supreme Court had, by an adequate review of the merits,
secured against such a result. Nevertheless, with the
Court of Appeals decision set aside, one may now hope
that the intellectual poverty of that effort, combined
with the larger debate, will deter Presidents from
attempting any similar action in the future.
Part I of this article examines the President's
commanding place in the conduct of American foreign
policy. Part II analyzes the Court of Appeals decision.
In Part III a broader design of the President's foreign
affairs power is formulated. Part IV canvasses a wider
spectrum of foreign affairs cases to support the proposed
design. Finally, Part V applies that design to the
historical record of treaty terminations.
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I
THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE:
OF POLICY INITIATIVE AND ADMINISTRATION DISCRETION
The President is without doubt the dominant actor
in the formulation and execution of American foreign
policy. In the "vast external realm," the modern Pres-
ident exercises powers of initiative and administration
more extensive and more decisive to the course of the
nation than is generally the case in domestic matters,
except perhaps in times of great emergency. Yet, the
reason for this is not immediately apparent from the
constitutional text. The framers, constrained by fears
of a too powerful executive, conferred upon the President
a limited number of essentially instrumental functions.
He was to be commander-in-chiefl3 and was to "make
treaties" with the "advice" as well as "consent" of
the Senate.14 He was to participate in the legislative
process by making recommendations1 5 and exercising the
veto power.1 6 He might nominate ambassadors, public
ministers and consuls, but with the "advice and consent"
of the Senate.1 7 He was to "receive ambassadors and
other public ministers" 1 8 to "take care that the laws
be faithfully executed"1 9 (Take Care clause). This was
the whole of it.
In contrast, not only was the Senate to share in )n
the making of treaties and the appointment of ambassadors,-'
but Congress was given the power to regulate the movement
of goods, 21 people, 22 and ideas 23 across our boundaries 25
and the authority to borrow, 24 to tax, and to spend money.
Congress was further empowered to declare war,2  to "define
13. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 1.
14. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
15. U.S. Const. art, II, sec. 3, cl. 1.
16. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 7, cl. 2.
17. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
18. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 3, cl. 1.
19. Id.
20. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
21. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 8, cl. 3.
22. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 4.
23. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
24. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 2.
25. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
26. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. Ii.
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offenses against the Law of Nations," 2 7 and to "make
all laws . . . necessar)f and proper for carrying into
execution" not only its own powers, but those of the
President as well. 8 There was scarcely a subject
likely to arise in the conduct of our relations with
other nations in which the Senate or the Congress was
not assigned a principal policy-formulating role.
If the structure of power implicit in the text of
the Constitution -- and the expectations that lay be-
hind that text -- bear little resemblance to the con-
temporary scheme of things, the transformation has
occurred largely through an elaboration upon the scanty
enumerations of Article II. Louis Henkin has put the
point well: "much of what the President has attained
may indeed lie in or between the lines of the Constitution
and all of it has been shaped by what is there."
2 9
Thus, the once purely ceremonial function of
"receiving" foreign ambassadors has been read to give
the recognition power to the President. When the con-
stitutional text was read as establishing the executive
as the sole "organ," or spokesman, of the nation in its
relations with other states, diplomacy became an ex-
clusive presidential province. With that came the power
to negotiate, the power to influence foreign expectations
and attitudes, the power to control the flow of infor-
mation and advice to Congress and the power to affect
its perception of events abroad, often decisively.
When, as commander-in-chief, Presidents assumed the
authority to direct the global disposition of American
military forces, they came to possess a vast practical
capacity to manipulate the nation's involvement in the
tensions that lead to war. In short,any President dis-
posed to exercise it eventually came to have a power of
initiative in the formulation of foreign policy that
exceeded anything he was likely to possess in the do-
mestic sphere. Significantly, there is no threat to this
power in the challenge to President Carter's actions.
In similar vein, his power as commander-in-chief,
his powers as sole "organ" of the nation and his respon-
sibilities under the Take Care clause, abetted by even
broader delegations of authority from Congress, have
27. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.
28. U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18.
29. L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 38
(1972).
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combined to give the President a vast discretion in the
administration of foreign policy. Again, there is no
threat to this power in the case against President Carter.
On the other hand, the constitutional text is not
just an historical curiosity. The extensive enumerations
of power in Article I still remain. That the President
possesses a vast power of policy initiative and a vast
power for securing congressional agreement with his
initiatives, does not mean that he possesses an ex-
clusive policy-making authority. That he exercises a
large discretion in the administration of policy does
not relieve him of duty to conform to that policy.
History has worked less of a change in the formal
allocations of authority under the Constitution than
an elaboration upon the President's enumerated powers.
This elaboration has permitted him to exploit the polit-
ical dynamics of the twentieth century to limit the
scope and independence of congressional judgment. Never-
theless, that judgment must be exercised. And when Con-
gress determines to assert its independence, the consti-
tutional limits on the presidential office are quite
apparent indeed, often dramatically.
It is vital that we not transform the practical
control of policy derived from the exercise of initiative
and administrative discretion into a constitutionally-man-
dated exclusive power of policy decision. This point
goes to the very heart of our success as a constitutional
democracy: the right of each generation, operating with-
in a continuing framework of government, to work out
its own balance between the competing values at stake in
all governance. It is also essential to securing true
effectiveness in foreign policy. If the long course of
our history teaches us anything, it is that no insti-
tutional arrangement can threaten the long-range effect-
iveness of policy more than the imperial presidency. Deep
within the fundamental political dynamics of the nation
lies an antipathy to all that such an arrangement por-
tends. Only in times of maximum danger are we likely
to tolerate the arrangement and even then tolerance is
likely to be short lived. To ignore these dynamics, to
posit the ideal of a self-sufficient Presidency, is the
surest road to both the abuse of power and to the popular
disenchantment and inconstancy which will ultimately de-
feat any policy, however wise it may seem to the professional
diplomatist, academic expert, or other minion of the foreign
affairs establishment.
Yet, this is precisely the danger we face. Spotted
throughout our constitutional history, insinuating itself
[VOL. 6
1979] POWER TO TERMINATE TREATIES 167
into an occasional court decision, is a ritual chant.
Outside the constitutional text, referenced by the
executive power clause, there lies, it is claimed, some
broader "inherent" power in the President to formulate
and conduct foreign policy. Vague, elastic, the idea
is the source of rhetoric that can be used to transform
the textually limited character of the presidential
office into a self-sufficient policy-formulating
institution. At bottom, this is what is at stake in the
constitutional debate over the President's handling of
the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. By his decision
the President boldly asserted his unilateral right to
override policies established jointly by President and
Senate, policies that intimately pertain to Congress'
war powers. One could scarcely conceive of a more
audacious claim for the Presidency as a self-sufficient
policy-making institution. It is that claim that the
Court of Appeals saw fit to uphold.
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II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION:
AN EXERCISE IN THE RHETORICAL TRADITION.
1. The Rhetorical Formulation
In language reminiscent of Alexander Hamilton
30
and of Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. United States,31
the Court of Appeals majority commences its defense of
the President by alluding to the executive power clause.
It observes that, when compared with the specificity of
the grants to the other departments the clause is
notable for its lack of definition.k2 Then, citing
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 33 it observes
that the whole of the foreign affairs power of the
sovereign United States is vested in the federal
government. The stage appears set for a bold thrust.
Because-it constitutes an open-ended (undefined) grant
of power, the court appears prepared to argue that the
executive power clause vests in the President all power
belonging to the federal government not expressly re-
served to the other departments of government, at least
if those powers pertain to the conduct of foreign affairs.
In the latter sphere, the court seems ready to say,
Congress possesses no implied powers whatever.
The argument has an intriguing aspect. It appears
as an attempt to escape the vagueness of the "inherency"
notion and to discover a content for the executive power
clause in the structure of the constitution text. The
specificity of the extensive enumerated grants of power
to Congress in Article I is used as evidence that the
open-ended executive power clause was intended as a
repository for powers not given elsewhere. Once this is
accomplished, however, the enumerated grants of Article
I are conveniently and understandably forgotten.
President Carter's action impinged directly on Congress'
war-powers.34
30. See note 10 supra.
31. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) discussed infra at note 79 and accompany-
ing text.
32. 617 F.2d at 704.
33. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) discussed in Court of Appeals Opinion,
note 32 supra, at 18.
34. See Part II infra.
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Accordingly, it was no longer the enumerated grants of
Article I but the absence of a functional grant (i.e.,
participation in treaty terminations) to Congress that
defined the scope of the residual executive power clause.
The device is transparent and contradicted by numerous
decisions, a point to which we shall return.65 For the
present we can do no more than read the court as restat-
ing the traditional "inherent powers" argument, while
evidencing some reticence to embrace that argument.
This reticence becomes even more evident when the
court suddenly backs away from the bold approach upon
which it seemed bent and turns to arguing that termin-
ations of treaties are a special case with the Pres-
ident's foreign affairs power. The President is the
constitutional representative of the United States in
all "external affairs."'36 He is, the court notes,
quoting Curtiss-Wright the "sole organ and the Federal
Government in the field of international relations."'37
That function, it adds, is "not confined to being a
channel of communication" but "embraces an active policy 3 8
determination as to the conduct of the United States ....
Moreover, the President alone negotiates treaties and
consequently has the initiative in formulating all
treaties. 39 He can refuse to ratify a treaty after it
has received senatorial approval and the Senate cannot
override his "veto."'4 0 The court also reads significance
into the fact that the treaty power is found in Article
II rather than in Article 1.41 Finally the President's
power of initiative in treatymaking and his control of
the notice-giving function combine in the court's mind
to create a case in which a decision requiring congres-
sional or senatorial approval of all treaty terminations,
35. See Part II infra.
36. 617 F.2d at 705.
37. Id. at 707.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 705.
40. Id. The only difference between the President's power to
"veto" treaties and his power to "veto" statutes is that the latter
veto may not be overridden only so long as the President can persuade
more than one third of the -membership of either House of Congress to
his view¢.
41. Id. This is of dubious significance. Up through the Report
of the Committee on Detail of the Constitutional Convention, the Treaty
Power appeared in Article I. The transfer to Article II, was done at
the last minute by the Committee on Style.
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similar to the "specific requirements of initial approval,"
would constitute "an unprecedented feat of judicial
construction. "42
At the threshold, it is important to observe the full
import of this reasoning. Not surprisingly, in a
government of divided powers, the President possesses a
vital monopoly of instrumental powers by which the
government carries out all aspects of its foreign policy,
not just its treaty policies. He is the "sole organ"
of the nation in all its international relations. He
alone can negotiate, sign and ratify all international
agreements. He alone can officially notify foreign govern-
ments of intended American actions, irrespective of whether
those actions pertain to a treaty. He alone conducts
diplomacy, commands the troops in war, and must "take care
that the law" pertaining to our foreign affairs be
"faithfully executed." By virtue of these powers the
President has come, in practical terms, to possess a
vast power of initiative over the formulation of all
foreign policy, not just treaty policies.
From this, it would seem to follow that if the
President's power to initiate treaty policy and his con-
trol of the formal instruments of implementation combine
to confer upon him a power to decide all treaty questions
without reference to Congress or Senate, except as the
Constitution expressly requires the latter's concurrence,
the same must be true of all foreign policy decisions.
Except as the Piesident finds that the successful pur-
suit of a policy requires the exercise of a function ex-
pressly conferred upon the Congress or Senate (e.g.,
senatorial consent to the making of a treaty; a congres-
sional declaration of war or enactment of a substantive
statute or appropriations act) the formulation as well
as execution of the nation's foreign policies belong
exclusively to the President. Neither Congress nor
Senate possesses any implied foreign affairs power what-
ever.
Thus the court arrived at precisely that bold
assertion of an "inherent" presidential power over
foreign policy that is characteristic of the rhetorical
tradition and which it seemed so intent upon avoiding.
Indeed, the court itself is very much alert to this
fact. The balance of the opinion is largely devoted to
showing why treaty terminations are a unique foreign
42. Id.
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policy matter and to why the Taiwan situation is unique.
The effort, however, is at best unpersuasive; 4 3 at
43. Further evidencing its concern for the sweeping implications
of the core theory, the court acknowledges that the "vital functions" of
the President in "deciding upon" a treaty's "viability" might "interact
with Congress' legitimate concerns and powers." Then, however, it re-
fuses to decide how that interaction might affect Gotdwater. To do so
would "prematurely intrude" the judiciary into the picture. 617 F.2d at
707. This is a remarkable statement. On one hand, the conclusion that
the President has the "vital function" of determining upon a treaty's
"viability" is derived entirely from the core theory (i.e., the absenceT
decision). On the other hand, the court admits that theoretically, at
least, Congress might have "legitimate concerns and power" that could in-
trude upon such a question. If so, what remains of the core theory?
The issue seems to have been radically revised. The question now seems
to be whether Congress' "legitimate concerns and powers" did in fact in-
trude. As if to underscore the point, the court immediately proceeds
to consider intrusion into the competing claims of Congress and Presi-
dent that it had already declared "premature."
Thus, it notes that the power to extend recognition to a foreign
government belongs exclusively to the President. Id. at 706. It then
concludes that the "president makes a responsible claim that he has
authority as Chief Executive to determine that there is no meaningful
vitality to a mutual defense treaty when there is no recognized state."
Id. This is an intriguing statement because of the judicial intrusion
implied (i.e., it judges the President's claim of authority as "respon-
sible") and because of what the court does not say. Note first that,
unlike Justice Brennan (Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S.Ct. at 539 [1979])
the court does not argue that because the recognition power belongs ex-
clusively to the President, he likewise has the exclusive power to
terminate any treaty with a third nation if termination is an element
in the recognition decision. The latter argument cannot be reconciled
with United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 204 (1941), would prove much too
much (see infra note 191 and accompanying text) and is improbable on
its face. The President's exclusive possession of the recognition
power is more the legacy of history and the necessities of diplomacy
in an age of slow communication than a matter dictated by the values
and practical scheme of government underlying our Constitution. Note
also, that the court is not arguing that a defense treaty must, as a
matter of law, cease to exist upon the withdrawal of de jure recognition
from the governing authorities in a foreign state. It would have been
sheer folly for the court to have adopted such a position since the
Executive had carefully not done so (see Taiwan, Hearings Before the
Conmittee on Foreign Relations, on S. 245, 96th Cong., ist Sess. 49
(1979) [statement of Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State])
and had carefully refrained from either recognizing Peking as sovereign
over Taiwan or even recognizing Peking's claims of sovereignty over the
island (i.e., we only "acknowledged" that Peking had advanced the claim.
We have in short, not adopted a "one China" policy.)
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worst, clumsy.4 4 The decision to sustain the President
43. (continued)
Id. at 19 and 29. (Also, compare the Joint Communique of December 15,
1978 with the separate statements by the United States and by the Peo-
ples Republic of China, 18 Int'l Legal Materials 273 et seq.) This
position was necessary to protect the fifty-five other treaties we
continue to maintain with the authorities of Taiwan.
On what basis, then, did the court conclude that the Presi-
dent's claim of authority was a "responsible" claim? The answer could
appear to be either (1) because of the core theory (i.e., the absence of
any implied power in Congress to participate in treaty termination deci-
sions generally) or (2) because Congress has no "legitimate concerns or
power" in any case where the President decides to terminate a treaty as
an incidence of de-recognizing the governing authorities of a foreign
state. Since we have already been told that it cannot be the core
theory (Congress' powers can interact with the President's "vital func-
tion"), it must be the second. Yet, we are never told why Congress has
no such power or concern, a pregnant question in the case of a defense
treaty which may impinge upon Congress' war powers (see Part IV infra).
The court's argument, in other words, is either a blatant exercise in
question begging or the reassertion of the core theory under a smoke
screen. The latter would at least have the virtue of explaining the
conclusion, although it is a totally unprincipled explanation (see
Part II (2) and (3) infra).
44. The other argument advanced by the court as it intruded into
the competition between the President's "vital function" and Congress'
"legitimate concerns and power" (see note 43 supra) involves the ter-
mination clause of the treaty. This clause, the court triumphantly
claims, is "of central significance," an "over-arching" factor in the
case which "knit[s] together" all the "other considerations." (617 F.
2d at 708). The Chief Executive's authority is, the court announces,
"at its zenith when the Senate has consented to a treaty that expressly
provides for termination on one year's notice, and the President's action
is the giving of the notice of termination." Id. What an utterly re-
markable statement! If the only power that the President brought to the
case was his instrumental notice giving function and it is the marriage
of that function with the Senate's consent that raises his power to its
"zenith," what has happened to the core theory -- the utter lack of any
power in the Senate or Congress to insist on participating in the deci-
sion to give the termination notice? Apparently the Senate does have
some power to intrude upon the termination question since its consent
to the President making that decision is the "overarching" factor in the
case.
More pointedly, however, the argument is made out of whole
cloth. What, in fact, did the Senate consent to? It consented to a
clause permitting the sovereign United States to absolve itself of a
treaty obligation without violating international law. That was the sole
purpose of the clause. That is all the Senate consented to and nothing
in the transactions involving that clause, whether between the executive
[VOL. 6
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in Goldwater was tantamount to a decision conferring
44. (continued)
and the Taiwan government or between the Executive and the Senate, had
anything whatsoever to do with the constitutional relationship between
the President and Senate. Also, the right of termination is reserved
to the sovereign United States. If the Senate is not the sole
repository of American sovereignty, neither is the President. Further-
more, there is no hint in this, or in any other treaty confirmation
proceeding, that either the President or the Senate thought that, by
approving such a clause, the latter was delegating a broad termination
power to the former. It is nothing but delegation by accident (not
even implication) or, more accurately perhaps, by judicial fiat. In-
deed, many, if not most, of the treaties to which the United States is
now a party, reserve some such unilateral right of termination to the
parties. As a consequence these erstwhile and quite accidental dele-
gations of authority taken together would probably represent the
single largest transfer of legislative authority to the President since
the National Recovery Act, declared unconstitutional in A.L.A.
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The
Schecter case, in fact, raises an intriguing point. Since the Mutual
Defense Treaty constituted both an international compact and a source
of domestic law (see text accompanying note 67 infra) and, since
the court conceded that the termination of the domestic law effects
of a treaty was indistinguishable from the repeal of a statute
617 F.2d at 705, the delegation of authority so blithely
ascribed to the Senate would seem to be indistinguishable from a
totally open ended, unguided authority to repeal a statute. Surely,
any attempt to delegate such authority to the President would raise a
bit of a constitutional question. It would find no parallel in the
domestic cases and would not be sanctioned by the more expansive possi-
bilities announced in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936) (see text accompanying note 94 infra). Nor can the
theory be squared with the Supreme Court's decision in Van der wayde v.
Ocean Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1936), where it was the passage of a later
inconsistent statute and not the termination clause in the applicable
treaty that supplied the constitutional warrant for the President's
decision to invoke that clause. (see text accompanying note 173 infra).
In practical terms, the court's theory would virtually guarantee a
refusal by the Senate in future cases to sanction a termination clause
without either a reservation or some declaration concerning its rights.
Such a development would introduce an unnecessary issue not only into
the senatorial proceedings but into the international negotiations as
well. Constructed out of whole cloth, this theory is also perverse.
This is not to deny, of course, that the President and Senate
may fashion a working relationship on the termination question involv-
ing the grant of substantial discretion to the President. But the
termination clause in the Mutual Defense Treaty represents no effort
in that direction. Consult the effort in S. Res. 15 to interpret
the clause in this fashion (Report of the Committee on Foreign ReZations
on S. Res., 15 96th Cong., 1st. Sess., at 1 [1979). The effort was
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upon him an independent power to terminate all treaties
under any circumstance. The case takes the court's
theory to its outer limits.
In Goldwater President Carter claimed a power to
ignore or override the policies embodied in a treaty where
both the treaty regime and its attendant policies were
in all respects viable except for the single fact that
he alone had decided that the nation should pursue a
different course. 4 5 Implicit in that decision was the
President's willingness to take certain strategic risks
which impinged directly upon commitments made in treaties
with other nations and regarding Congress' exercise of
its war powers. 4 6 Under the Court of Appeals' logic,
in other words, the President's initiative in treaty-
making and his instrumental power to give notice of a
decision to terminate a treay served first to negate any
implied right in Congress or the Senate to participate in
the termination decision. Next, it served as the source
of an affirmative power in the President to override
policies previously agreed upon by a former President
and two thirds of the Senate, each acting pursuant to
an express constitutional grant of power concerning a
most delicate responsbility. Nothing comparable to
such a claim is to be found anywhere in the history of
unilateral presidential terminations 4 7 It is far from
clear that either Alexander Hamilton48 or Chief
44. (continued)
roundly defeated. And finally, nothing in the historical record of
treaty terminations evidences a working relationship that would en-
compass the action taken by President Carter in the Taiwan case (see
Part V infr'a).
45. See Part V infra.
46. See Part IV infr'a.
47. See Part V infra.
48. In his famous debate with Madison, Hamilton contended that
while the President could not declare war, the war power was a
"concurrent authority," an example of the "...right of the executive
... to determine the condition of the Nation, though it may in its
consequences, affect the exercise of the power of the legislature
to declare war. The legislature is still free to perform its duties,
according to its own sense of them though the executive, in the
exercise of its constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent
state of things, which ought to weigh in the legislative decision."
7 Hamilton (Pacificus), The Works of Alexander Hamilton 76 (T.C.
Hamilton ed.). It is by no means clear from this that Hamilton viewed
the President as empowered to conduct any hostilities he chose without
ever obtaining a congressional authorization. Certainly he cannot
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Justice Taft4 9 would have contemplated so bold a claim
for their "inherent powers" theory, or that Curtiss-Wright
can be read to go so far.5 0 It is an extraordinary theory:
foreign policy making is an exclusive presidential sphere
except as it encounters some express functional grant
to Congress, but even then the President may override pol-
icies established through a textually required process in-
volving both President and one or both houses of Congress.
48. (continued)
be read as asserting that the President could persist in carrying on a
war if Congress expressly considered and rejected a grant of
authority to do so; that he could simply ignore or override the
congressional will.
49. Any analogy between the President's removalpower to which
Chief Justice Taft was addressing himself in Myers v. lJnited States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926) (discussed infra at note 78 and accompanying text),
and the power to terminate treaties is suspect at best. The President
must obviously have some control over the subordinates through whom
he discharges his constitutional duties, and that surely might
include a power to remove those subordinates. It is thus a power
that pertains to the President's control over his own department
within the government. Treaty terminations, on the other hand, are
an exercise by the government of its sovereign power of substantive
governance. A presidential claim to "sovereignty" over the executive
department is not quite the same as a claim to the sovereign power
of the United States. Also the removal of subordinate is a
managerial or administrative act, lacking the more generalized and
continuing prescriptive quality that we often associate with law-
making. The termination of a treaty, however, is an affirmative pre-
scriptive act with a generalized and continuing effect.
50. See text accompanying note 94 infra.
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2. The Core Theory; Analytic and
Textual Contradictions
To negotiate and sign a treaty, to proclaim its
ratification, and, as "sole organ," to give the notice
terminating a treaty are intrinsically no more than
functions necessary to carry into effect some antecedent
policy decision. The power to perform those functions
does not, by its own terms, imply an independent power
to make that decision. Indeed, it is a first principle
for any government of divided powers that the depart-
ment charged with executing the basic choices that
determine the ends and manner of governance cannot, on
the strength of that charge alone, claim the power to
make those choices. Otherwise there could be no govern-
ment of divided powers. If we were to look to first
principles in defining the boundaries of the President's
"inherent" powers over foreign affairs, the result would
be disastrous to President Carter's cause and the whole
notion of presidential self-sufficiency in foreign
affairs.
Total reliance on such a principle, however, would
conflict with much constitutional history. Long practice
makes plain that the Executive is not invariably fore-
closed from exercising an independent policy-making power.
There are indeed situations inwhich the President possesses
not only the power to act without congressional warrant,
but to do so in open disregard of the congressional will.
As a practical matter, the President's virtual monopoly
of the instrumental powers of government assures that he
is far more than the mere executor of some other lawmaker's
antecedent will. He is a necessary participant in all
foreign policy decisionmaking. It would be strange in-
deed if the political values and practical necessities
that have brought vast powers of policy initiative to
the modern Presidency did not, on proper occasions, spill
over to transform that power into a power to decide and
act independently.51 All of this, however, is a far cry
from the Court of Appeals' use of the President's in-
strumental powers to bootstrap the presidential office
into a self-sufficient policy-making institution that can
invariably act without reference to, and even in defiance
of, the other branches of government, except as the de-
51. For a more complete discussion, see Part III.
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cision engages an express functional grant to one of
the latter.
In sum, history, if nothing else, has rendered any
theory of "inherent" presidential powers analytically
useless. Such meaning as might have been derived from
first principles is far too limited to be squared with
our constitutional traditions. But the use of the
"inherent powers" concept to transform the Presidency
into a vast, self-sufficient policy-making institution
constrained only by the express functional grants to
Congress, is even more offensive to those traditions.
We are in need of a new overarching allocative design
and a new analytic mode. We need something more rig-
orous than rhetoric and more sophisticated than textual
literalism to reconcile first principles with the pol-
itical values and practical experience of government
that so often combine to render our constitutional law
at once intellectually taxing and eminently workable.
Later we will pursue the search for such a design
with an inquiry into a separation of powers doctrine. 52
First, however, it is necessary to show that the Court
of Appeals' use of the "inherent powers" theory not only
contradicts first principles but encounters a number of
textual embarrassments of which the court was only too
aware.
In spite of its cognizance of the enumerated grants
to Congress under Article I,53 the court had to ignore
the fact that the President's decision impinged directly
upon one such power -- the power to declare war. The
theory had to treat the enumerated grants of Article I
as irrelevant unless there first existed some express
grant to Congress of authority to participate in the
particular function giving rise to a question concern-
ing those subjects. A wide variety of judicial decisions,
however, including decisions by the Court of Appeals it-
self, have thoroughly repudiated any such principle.
For instance, the President cannot, merely by avoid-
ing a formal declaration of war, exercise an unlimited
power to conduct war without a congressional authorization.
54
52. For a more complete discussion see Section 3 of this Part.
53. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
54. See discussion on war process cases Part IV infra.
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The functional form of the grant to Congress (i.e., the
power to issue a declaration) is not controlling. It is
the subject matter of the decision -- the choice between
peace and war -- that dictates the necessity of congres-
sional participation. Likewise, Congress is given no
role in the function of making non-treaty agreements with
foreign nations. Yet, the President cannot, by entering
into such an agreement, prescribe crimes against the
United States.55 Neither can he, by such an agreement, 57
regulate foreign commerce56 or fix the value of the coinage,
at least insofar as the agreement is contrary to policies
expressed in an antecedent statute or treaty.58  Surely,
there is something anomalous in suggesting that while the
President cannot by agreement with a foreign power change
an established treaty relationship governing trade, he can
do so by unilaterally terminating the treaty.
This last example introduces a more general and far
more serious source of embarrassment for the court. If,
on the strength of his powers of initiative and adminis-
tration in treaty affairs and the absence of any express
right in Congress or Senate to participate in treaty ter-
minations, the President may override the policies laid
down in a treaty by unilaterally terminating it, then he
should have the same right to repeal a statute pertaining
to foreign affairs. In practical terms, his power to
initiate, to veto, and to administer such a statute, differ
only in degree from his powers over the making and
55. The Over the Top, 5 F. 2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925). But consider the
possible exception implicit in the powers ascribed to the President in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) and discussed at note
95 infra and in the accompanying text.
56. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F. 2d 655, 659 (4th Cir.
1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955); Consumer Union of the United
States v. Kissinger, 506 F. 2d 136, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
57. The practice seems firmly established by the extensive legislation
used to authorize, ratify and implement our international monetary arrangements,
e.g., The Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the Bretton Woods Agreement Act, the
Special Drawing Rights Act, the Par Value Modification Act, and the Balance
of Payments Authority contained in the Trade Act of 1974.
58. Dicta in the cases cited note 56 supra suggest that the regulation
of foreign commerce is a subject upon which the President possesses no in-
dependent law-making power whatsoever. But this would seem too broad a
rule. Surely occasions might arise where the President could independently
regulate commerce on the substantive authority of the Take Care clause or
his power as "commander-in-chief," provided, of course, that he does not
violate the expressed will of the statute or treaty makers. Also consider
L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 180 (1972).
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administration of treaties. 59  The Constitution is as
silent with respect to the repeal of statutes as it is
with respect to the termination of treaties.
Stung by this argument, 6 0 and by related questions
concerning the necessary and proper clause, 61 the court
responds by stating that treaties are sui generis. They
are not just another law but are also international com-
pacts with both international and domestic consequences.
The President, according to the court, controls the in-
ternational consequences; Congress, in its "role as law-
maker," controls the domestic.92 Now, obviously, the
court did not mean to imply that after January 1, 1980
the Mutual Defense Treaty, although terminated as an
international compact, still remained in full force and
effect as domestic law. Instead, the court was operating
upon two assumptions: first, that a treaty of this
character was only an international compact and not a
source of domestic law, and second, that while the power
to supercede a treaty as domestic law might constitute
an exercise of the legislative power vested in Congress,
the termination of a treaty as an international compact
did not do so. 63
59. It is true that the Senate is entirely dependent upon the
President's willingness to negotiate treaties. It is also theoreti-
cally true that Congress can initiate statutes independent of
presidential suggestion. Nevertheless, the practical fact is that,
in the foreign affairs field, virtually all important legislation
originates in the executive branch, so that the distinction is mini-
mal. For a comparison of the veto power see note 40 supra.
60. 617 F.2d at 705.
61. The question is why the "necessary and proper" clause
should not constitute precisely the functional grant which the
Court of Appeals thought did not exist. Certainly, the termination
of a treaty is law-making in the sense encompassed by that clause.
It negates obligations that would otherwise be binding upon the
sovereign United States under international law. If the terms of a
treaty are invoked as rules of decision in a court of law, the act of
terminating the treaty definitively bars a decision predicated upon
those terms. More affirmatively, the termination of a treaty brings
into existence a new normative regime, whether embodied in customary
international law, in an antecedent and subsisting statute or in
common law. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
Under the necessary and proper clause, Congress is empowered to make
all laws necessary to carry out not only its own enumerated powers
but those of the President as well. Accord, 617 F.2d at 717-718
(McKinnon, J., dissenting).
62. 617 F.2d at 705.
63. Thus the court poses the issue in the following terms:
the issue here.. .is not Congress' legislative powers to super-
cede or affect the domestic impact of a treaty; the issue is
whether the Senate (or Congress) must in this case give its
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With regard to the first assumption, it is notable that
many of the obligations imposed on the United States by the
Mutual Defense Treaty lies within the province of the Exe-
cutive to perform,64 while the performance of all those ob-
ligations, including the defense commitment in Article V,
requires affirmative executive cooperation. 65 Since the
Take Care Clause encompasses treaties as well as statutes,
these provisions of the treaty would seem to constitute
rules of conduct binding upon the Executive by force of the
latter's constitutional obligation "to faithfully execute
the Law." Arguably, Article X of the treaty, by means of
the supremacy clause, also binds Congress to some affirma-
tive action. 6 ' By force of the Constitution, in other words,
the treaty lays clown a rule of domestic law. That is pre-
cisely the case with every other self-executing treaty.
6
63. (continued)
prior consent to discontinue a treaty which the President
thinks is desirable to terminate in the national interest and
pursuant to a provision in the treaty itself. Id.
64. Mutual Defense Treaty, Article I (settlement of disputes by
peaceful means), Article IV (consultation by foreign ministers), and
Article VII (right of the United States to dispose of its armed forces
in Taiwan).
65. Article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty provides as follows:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the
West Pacific Area directed against the territories
of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act
to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes. Any such armed attack
and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council of the
United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to restore and maintain international
peace and security.
For a more complete discussion of the President's constitutional role in
carrying out this obligation see text accompanying note 163 infra.
66. It has been asserted that Congress cannot be constitutionally
bound to carry out the terms of a treaty, although its failure to do so
may give rise to a violation by the United States of its international
legal obligations. The theory is that no legislature can constitution-
ally bind its successors, and that the same rule applies to treaties.
However, in the special context of the international legal obligations
imposed upon the United States by the Mutual Defense Treaty (see note 67
infra) it can certainly be argued that Congress is under a constitu-
tional obligation at least to consider the use of armed force (vote yes
or no) if Taiwan were attacked, even though it might not be considered
constitutionally bound by any limitations on its discretion which, as a
matter of international law, apply to the sovereign United States.
67. It will be observed that under Article V of the Mutual Defense
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It constitutes a rule of domestic law not of its own force,
but, by force of the Constitution. Anytime the Constitution
67. (continued) Treaty (see note 65 for text) an attack on
Taiwan does not automatically require that the United States come to the
defense of the island. If the words "in accordance with its constitu-
tional processes" mean anything, they would seem to mean that each party
reserves some right to judge whether, by what means and to what extent
it shall respond to an attack on the other party. It is this fact that
has led some to suggest that the treaty is not self-executing. Appa-
rently, the idea is that, so long as there remains some decision to be
made by American governmental authorities before the United States
actually responds to an attack on Taiwan, the treaty cannot be con-
sidered self-executing. This position quite erroneously distinguishes
between a self-executing and non-self-executing treaty of alliance on
the basis of whether the treaty is an automatic or non-automatic com-
mitment to war, assuming that the treaty-makers could actually make an
automatic commitment. It also tends to reflect some confusion between
the international law effects and certain constitutional effects of a
treaty.
A self-executing treaty, by its own force, imposes upon the
United States an international legal obligation to act or not act in a
fashion which, absent the treaty, would be open to it. By operations
of the Constitution, that treaty then becomes a source of domestic law,
unless, by reason of the subject matter, legislation is required to
render the treaty obligations domestic law. Even in this latter case,
however, the treaty may still give rise to a completely bididing inter-
national obligation of the United States if the negotiators are care-
less. A non-self-executing treaty is a treaty which, according to the
intention of the parties, will not operate as a source of domestic law
without implementing legislation. Generally, the negotiation will also
make sure that such a treaty does not give rise to an international le-
gal obligation until the legislation is passed, although it might imply
an obligation actually to deliberate upon the necessary legislation.
In such deliberations, however, any limitation on the exercise of an
absolute discretion would have the aspect of a moral obligation only.
Based upon this distinction, the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan con-
stitutes a self-executing treaty. By its own force it imposes upon the
United States an international legal obligation and it was plainly the
contemplation of the parties that no further domestic legal action
would be necessary to give that obligation domestic law effect. The
point is illustrated rather nicely by the discussion in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on the NATO Treaty, the provisions of which
are essentially the same as the Taiwan treaty. As explained by the
late Dean Acheson, if Europe were attacked, the United States would not,
by that fact alone, be under an international legal obligation to de-
clare war. Congress and President would still be free to decide what
action, if any, was necessary to restore and maintain the security of
the North Atlantic sea. Nevertheless, the treaty did, the Secretary
made clear, place a limitation upon the factors that Congress and
President might otherwise consider in making their decision. They were
1979] 181
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
imposes upon the public officials of the United States a
legal obligation to conform their official behavior to the
67. (continued)
bound to consider only what was necessary for maintaining security in
the treaty area and to make a good-faith judgment on that question. If,
the Secretary added, we confronted an attack comparable to those "that
had twice occurred in this century," then in his view, nothing less than
"the use of armed forces" would legally be required. The Secretary, in
sum, made amply plain that while the Treaty may give the United States
some flexibility in judging what its response to an attack on a treaty
partner might be, that flexibility is far less than would have been a-
vailable without the treaty. The United States Government was under an
unqualified international legal obligation both with respect to the
boundaries of the discretion it might exercise and the necessity of ex-
ercising a good-faith judgment within those boundaries, and that obli-
gation did not contemplate implementing legislation or any other fur-
ther domestic legal action. It is at this point that the tendency to
confuse the international law effects of a treaty with another quite
distinctive constitutional effect begins to creep in. The internation-
ally binding limitations of the Taiwan treaty on the exercise by the
United States of its discretion pertain to a discretion in which
Congress must join with the President. Moreover, it may be argued that
a treaty can never constitutionally limit Congress' discretion. The
theory is that no legislature can constitutionally bind a subsequent
legislature, and that this rule is as applicable to treaties as to
statutes. Thus, the argument seems to be that if Congress cannot con-
stitutionally have its discretion limited by a treaty, no treaty which
requires an exercise of discretion by Congress can have a domestic law
effect, can be self-executing. Even if, arguendo, one accepts the pre-
mise that Congress is never constitutionally bound by a treaty limita-
tion on its discretion that does not ipso facto establish that the
treaty can have no domestic law effect, i.e., that is cannot be non-
self-executing. It may still, under the Constitution, bind the execu-
tive and, unless legislation is a constitutional predicate to judicial
action, the judiciary as well. Whether a treaty is to have such effect
remains a matter of the intention of the parties. In the case of the
Mutual Defense Treaty, Secretary Acheson's statement makes plain that
the legal limitations imposed upon the exercise of discretion by the
United States were not intended to be contingent upon any further im-
plementing action insofar as those limitations could constitutionally
operate as rules of domestic law. And certainly insofar as those limi-
tations pertained to executive discretion, there was no constitutional
barrier to their immediate operation as rules of domestic law (i.e., to
be self-executing). One could go further and argue that even with re-
spect to Congress, those limitations had a domestic law effect because,
constitutionally, Congress could be compelled by the treaty affirmative-
ly to deliberate on whether to respond to an attack on Taiwan. And
certainly, if one rejects the notion that Congress cannot be constitu-
tionally bound to treaty limitations on its discretion, Article V of the
Mutual Defense Treaty was fully self-executing. See generally H. Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 156 (1972).
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terms of a treaty, that treaty operates both as a source
of domestic law and as an international compact. To deny
this, to suggest that some self-executing treaties, such
as treaties of alliance, can have no domestic law effect,
rests upon a very limited conception of law.
Compare, for example, an alliance with a self-ex-
ecuting commercial treaty, which is invariably thought to
constitute a source of domestic law. The alliance, of
course, can have just as great a domestic impact and be
as legally binding on national officials as the commercial
treaty. The only difference lies in the fact that there is
likely to be some individual with standing to formulate a
justiciable challenge to any official interpretation of the
commercial treaty. Otherwise identical, the commercial and
defense treaties differ only in the availability of someone
with standing to sue. To reply on this distinction, however,
as a basis for denying that the alliance constitutes a
source of domestic law. reflects the naive idea that even
the most authoritatively prescribed rules of official con-
duct are not "law" unless they can be vouchsafed judicial
enforcement. It is an idea that would horrify the inter-
national lawyer. Worse, it would confine the supremacy
clause within boundaries dictated by notions of justi-
ciablity wholly unrelated to the purposes of that clause.
It would mean that numerous appronriations and other statutes
were not part of the "law of the land"; an eccentric
suggestion at best. If eccentricity is to be avoided and
all statutes viewed as sources of domestic law, the same must
be true of all self-executing treaties, including the Mutual
Defense Treaty.
If the Mutual Defense Treaty was both a source of
domestic law and an international compact and if, as the
court concedes, only Congress could supercede a treaty as
a rule of domestic law, 68 then the President's ostensible
power to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty as an inter-
national compact is anomalous at best. The President, act-
ing without congressional concurrence, has the authority to
relieve the United States of its international legal obli-
gations under the treaty, but United States officials, in-
cluding the President, remain bound by the Constitution to
conform their conduct to the treaty. To avoid this anomaly
one must conclude that since, according to the court, the
power to supercede the domestic effect of a treaty was in-
68. 617 F.2d at 7Q5.
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distinguishable from the power to repeal a statute, 69 the
President either acted unconstitutionally or has the power
to repeal foreign affairs statutes. 7 0 Surely it was the
former. 71
In sum, while one can credit the court with a valiant
effort to bring some rigor to the "inherent powers" theory,
the analytic confusion, textual anomalies, and contradic-
tions that attended the effort demonstrate the difficulties
of reconciling that theory with either the language, struc-
ture or traditional interpretations of the Constitution.
One can readily admit that by reason of his enumerated powers
and the political dynamics of the twentieth century, the
modern President possesses vast resources of initiative and
administration in foreign policy. But no serious legal
analysis can transform that initiative and administrative
discretion into a self-sufficient power adequate to support
President Carter's actions. In this context one is reminded
of the wisdom and warning of Justice Jackson in the SteeZ
Seizure Case. 7 2 Responding to the claim that the President
had a broad "inherent" power to seize the nation's steel
mills, the Justice first noted that a "loose and irrespon-
sible use of the adjectives colors all no-legal and much
legal discussion of presidential powers, ' 3 listing first
among those adjectives the notion of "inherent" powers. He
then added:
The claim of inherent and unrestricted Presidential
powers has long been a persuasive dialectical wea-
pon in political controversy. While it is not
surprising that counsel should grasp support from
such unadjudicated claims of power, a judge cannot
accept self-serving press statements of the attorney
for one of the interested parties as authority in
answering a constitutional question even if the
advocate was hinself. But prudence has counseled
that actual reliance on such nebulous claims stop
short of provoking a judicial test.
7
69. Only the termination of a treaty as an international compact
was, according to the court, a non-legislative act. Id.
70. The court, of course, did not argue that the termination of a
statute was a non-legislative act.
71. Once established that the Mutual Defense Treaty is a source
of domestic law as well as an international compact, the only way out of
this conclusion is through the anomoly already noted; namely that the
Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan remains binding upon the officers of
the United States even though it is no longer a subsisting agreement
with the authorities on Taiwan.
72. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, (The Steel Seizure
Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1972).
73. Id. at 646-47.
74. Id. at 647.
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3. The Core Theory and the Separation of Powers Doctrine
The Court of Appeals was obviously fearful lest, by
labeling the termination of a treaty a "legislative" act, it
prejudice a decision to assign the termination power to the
Executive acting alone. The label seemed to embarrass the
result. Underlying this fear one can readily liscern the
workings of a very distinctive view of the separation of
powers doctrine. It is a version which evokes the image of
a government the sum of whose powers are to be allocated
among its several departments according to whether those
powers, "by their nature '7 5 are to be categorized as legis-
lative, executive, or judicial. Moreover, unless the Con-
stitution expressly commands it, no department should be
permitted to intrude into the "natural" sphere of decision
which appears to constitute such an intrusion. W1hile this
version of the doctrine is sometimes explained as a means
of preserving departmental independence, it would appear
primarily concerned with assuring order and efficiency in
governmental affairs and might properly be called the
functional-orderliness version of the separation of powers
doctrine.
Nothing in the language of the Constitftion -- nothing
in the supremacy clause or in Article I -- commands this
strict disassociation of the President from the law-making
powers of the government.7 6 More importantly, moved by the
75. The phrase is Hamilton's, see note 19 supra. For a more con-
temporary expression see Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) quoted at note 82 infra.
76. As noted, the supremacy clause does not pretend to define or
control all the forms of law-making in which the government might en-
gage. Article I grants to Congress only the legislative powers "herein
granted." The President participates in the legislative process through
both the power to recommend and the power to veto laws. His participa-
tion in the making of treaties, renders him a "law-maker." While the
functional-orderliness version of the doctrine treats these examples
of the "President-as-legislator" as expressed exceptions to the general
scheme of the Constitution, that characterization is derived solely
from the political values one chooses to prefer. Under different pri-
orities one could as readily view them as examples of a preferred
structure. There is, in short, nothing textually inevitable about the
functional-orderliness version of the separation of powers doctrine.
1979] 185
186 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
difficulties of squaring the notion of "inherent" de-
partmental spheres with our political values and the
practical needs of a working government, the Supreme Court
has unequivocally repudiated the functional- orderliness
conception.7 7 It has revitalized a far more venerable
Madisonian version. And it is this latter version which is
our starting point in breaking away from both the literal
and rhetorical traditions and fashioning a new, more ade-
quate allocative design for the foreign relations powers
of the Federal government and for demonstrating how far
President Carter strayed beyond the boundaries of that
design.
For this purpose we can borrow from the President's
apologists and stt with one of their favorite cases, Myers
v. United States, In Myers the Supreme Court held that
the President had an "inherent" power to remove executive
officers, and, therefore, could do so without regard to a
statute requiring senatorial consent to the removal. 7 9
Analytically, the Court's theory could be given a very
limited meaning. It could signify only that, because the
President,in "faithfully executing the law," or acting as
commander-in-chief or as "sole organ" of the nation, must
77. See notes 90 and 91 infra, and accompanying text.
78. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
79. Conceding that the statute had been violated, the Myers
decision nevertheless held that the President was constitutionally em-
powered to act without regard to the statutory limitations. According
to Chief Justice Taft, the removal power could be read into the
executive power clause of Article II and into the President's power
to appoint such executive officials. But if the removal power was to
be implied from the appointive power, the requirement for senatorial
consent to appointments would seem to imply a right in the Senate to
participate in removals as well. The Chief Justice answers that the
grant of legislative power under Article I "is limited to powers therein
enumerated." On the other hand, the grant of the executive power to the
President under Article II is given "in general terms strengthened by
specific terms where emphasis is appropriate, and limited by direct ex-
pression where limitation is needed." That no express limit was placed
on the power of removal by the executive constituted,according to the
Chief Justice, a "convincing indication that none was intended." (td.
at 117). As the Chief Justice acknowledged, this answer is straight out
of Hamilton. (Id. at 118). The executive power clause constituted an
affirmative grant of all authority that was "by its nature" (i .e.,
inherently) executive.
[VOL. 6
POWER TO TERMJINATE TREATIES
work through subordinates, he must also possess a power to
remove those subordinates. 80 "Inherent" could, in other
words, mean nothing more than "necessarily implied."
Such usage, however, would not have supplied a predi-
cate adequate for the holding in the case. It would only
have meant that the Constitution itself sanctioned the
President's removal of an officer; that he did not need an
antecedent statute. It would not have established that
Congress was powerless to regulate the President or that the
President could ignore the statute. Some additional reason,
apart from the fact that the removal power was a natural and
practical adjunct of the President's constitutionally
enumerated duties, had to be invoked if "inherent" was to
connote an "exclusive" or "plenary" power.
It was, of course, possible that the values or the
practical objectives served by giving the President autonomy
on the subject of executive removals merited taking this ad-
ditional step. Such a conclusion, however, would also have
entailed a judgment that the values or objectives served by
the exercise of congressional control were not as urgent or
weighty as those undergirding the principle of presidential
autonomy. A decision to elevate an incidental power into
an "exclusive" or "plenary" power could have rested upon a
discriminating inquiry into the values and practical ob-
jectives at stake in the competition for power.
In Myers, however, there is very little, if any, in-
quiry along these lines. Chief Justice Taft resorts instead
to the functional-orderliness version of the separation of
powers doctrine. He uses the fact that the removal of exe-
cutive officers is an implied power of the President to
evoke a broader sense that, by the natural order of things,
the question of removals was executive matter Ci.e., he la-
bels it an "inherent" power encompassed within the executive
power clause.) 81 Then, once the label was attached, the fact
80. The pragmatic arguments -- even the language employed by the
Chief Justice -- demonstrate that the Take Care clause, or any of the
President's other enumerated powers, was more than adequate to the pur-
pose.
81. Having read the removal power into the President's appointive
power, the Chief Justice had to have some rationale for cutting away the
same implication from the Senate's express right to participate in ap-
pointments. (See note 79 supra). This is the function performed by
placing the label "inherent" on an implied function. So far as execu-
tive officers were concerned both their appointment and their removal
were "inherently" executive functions. This meant, as the Chief
Justice more than once affirms, that when the Senate participated in
either an executive appointment or an executive removal it was partici-
pating in what was by its nature an executive act. Such participation
was an aberration to be tolerated only insofar as the Constitution
expressly required that
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that the Constitution failed to give Congress or the Senate
a role in the decision to remove an executive officer,
meant that the President was free to ignore any statute that
presumed to confer on the Senate a right to intrude.
8 2
The parallel to the Court of Appeals reasoning in
Goldwater is apparent. The initiative flowing from the
instrumental power to negotiate treaties and to give the
formal notice terminating a treaty is used to suggest that
treaty affairs generally and the decision to terminate a
treaty specifically are naturally presidential.8 3  The
conclusion is more intuitive than analytic. We are only
told that it would constitute an "unprecedented feat of
judicial construction" to believe otherwise. 84 Never-
theless, once categorized, the result is the same as in
Myers. Since the Constitution does not expressly assign to
the Congress or Senate any role in treaty terminations,
the President's "inherent" power becomes an "exclusive" or
"plenary" authority and the President is empowered to ignore
or override policies formulated by the treaty-makers.
There is another, wholly different, conception of
the separation of powers doctrine that would foreclose
81. (continued)
it be tolerated. The Chief Justice reveals his viewpoint rather plainly
in the words quoted at note 82 infra.
82. The Chief Justice nQtes:
If there is a principle in our Constitution, indeed
in any free Constitution more sacred than any other,
it is that which separates the legislative, executive
and judicial powers....
Their union under the confederation had not worked
well, as the members of the convention knew.
Montesquieu's view that the maintenance of in-
dependence between the Legislative, Executive and
the Judical branches was a security for the people
had their full approval.... Accordingly, the Constitution
was so framed as to vest in the Congress all legis-
lative powers therein granted, to vest in the Presi-
dent the executive power, and to vest in one Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as Congress might es-
tablish, the judicial power. From this division on
principle, the reasonable construction of the
Constitution must be that the branches must be kept
separate in all cases in which they are not expressly
blended, and the Constitution should be expounded to
blend them no more than it affirmatively requires.
272 U.S. at 116. The functional-orderliness conception is plain.
83. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
84. 617 7, 2d at 705.
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resort to any such line of argument. As Madison saw it
nearly two hundred years ago, separation of powers was a
device intended to constrain the government in its power
over the people by requiring, on appropriate questions,
the concurrence of two, if not t ree, independent and
potentially jealous departments. °° The mixing of powers --
the joining of decisional authority -- was the critical
element in the dynamics of this version. It found its
expression in the classic imagery of checks and balances.
Perhaps the most notable recent expression of this ver-
sion is found in Justice Brandeis' dissent in Myers:
The doctrine of the separation of powers
was adopted by the convention of 17807 not
to promote efficiency, but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose
was not to avoid friction, but, by means of
the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments to save the
people from autocracy.86
If intended to preserve liberty and the basic values of
a democratic society, it would be unthinkable if checks and
balances operated only on occasions when the Constitution
expressly assigned the Congress or Senate the function of
participating in a governmental decision. To the contrary,
implicit in this version of the doctrine is a recognition
that any governmental decision by the concurrent will of
President and Congress (or Presi ent and two-thirds of the
Senate, in the case of treaties) constitutes a more
authoritative act of governance than is possible when the
President alone decides the course of the nation. That
authoritativeness, in turn, reflects the belief that a con-
current decision can be taken as a surer and hence more legi
85. Madison saw the separation of powers as a basic tenet of a
free government. "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial, in the same hands, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny." J. Madison, A. Hamilton, and J. Jay, The
Federalist Papers 301 (W. Kendall & G. Carey eds. 1965). The branches,
however, could not be wholly unconnected. In order for one branch
effectively to limit the exercise of power by another, there must be an
overlapping of power. Each branch should wield power over the others
so that no one branch would become supreme. Id. at 308.
86. 272 U.S. at 293.
87. That the Constitution confers upon Congress the power to
override a presidential veto does not detract from this essential point.
The requirement to override assures that the decision is based upon an
adequate consensus.
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timate expression of the general will -- a decision con-
sonant with our democratic postulates -- and also a
more considered, and hence legitimate, limitation upon
individual liberty. A concern for legitimacy is the
hallmark of any version of the separation of powers
doctrine designed to preserve individual liberty and
basic democratic values. It necessarily implies a will-
ingness to require the sharing of power, even on occasions
when the Constitution does not expressly require it.
At the same time, because the Madisonian version of
the doctrine is rooted in a concern for governmental legi-
timacy, it does not invariably require a shared decision.
There can be no legitimate government unless it can also,
over time, demonstrate some minimum capacity to act
effectively. There are times, especially in conducting
foreign affairs, when speed, secrecy and unity in nation-
al expressions are essential to effective governance.
Quite obviously, these conditions cannot always be se-
cured if decisional authority is shared. Nor can one
ignore the fact that there are differences in perceptions,
in values, and in style between the Executive and Congress.
These differences are endemic to the function, structure,
and diverse constituencies served by the two branches. As
such, these differences render a shared power either
inimical to effective governance, or essential to it.
Under the tutelage of the Madisonian conception of
the separation of powers doctrine, in cases where the
Constitution is silent, any inquiry into the allocation
of power to make foreign policy must be cautious and
exacting. It is an inquiry to be guided by the impor-
tance of the substantive question being decided (i.e.,
its potential impact on the American people and the course
of the nation's affairs) and by the practical constraints
under which the decision must be made if it is to be
effective. Any allocative decision derived from this
matrix will look very different from a decision rooted
in a more abstract and intuitive inquiry into the es-
sential "nature" of a governmental function. At the
heart of this conception lies a concern for efficacy in
the conduct of foreign affairs. It is, however, a con-
cern carefully measured and constrained by the price it
would exact in terms of our democratic values. Conseq-
uently, it represents a workable concern for efficacy,
not, as the visionaries of the rhetorical tradition would
have it, an invitation to that ultimate in practical
folly, the imperial presidency.
Against this background, we can turn to the cases
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following Myers. The hallmark ofithese cases -- whether
they relate to the removal power or to other questions
pertaining to the President's control of his own depart-
ment -- is the rejection by the Supreme Court of the
functional-orderliness version of the separation of powers
doctrine in favor of the Madisonian interpretation.8 9
88. The Supreme Court's retreat from Chief Justice Taft's theories
starts with Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935),
in which the Court upheld a salary claim by the estate of a deceased
Federal Trade Commissioner who had been dismissed by President Roosevelt
before his statutory term expired. Myers was distinguished because the
Federal Trade Commission was established by Congress to carry out the
latter's policies and could not be characterized "as an arm or an eye
of the executive." The Commission's functions were, the Court thought,
to be performed "free from executive control," as evidenced by the
fact that the commission acted either "quasi-legislatively" or "quasi-
judicially." It was, hence, "an agency," not of the executive, "but of
the legislative or judicial departments." With respect to officers of
this character the President's power was not "illimitable." More
generally the removal power was, the Court announced, to "depend upon
the character of the office."
After Humphrey's Executor the Court in Wiener v. United States,
357 U.S. 349 (1958), upheld a claim for back salary by a member of the
War Claims Settlement Commission appointed by President Truman and dis-
missed by President Eisenhower before expiration of his statutory term.
Noting the "intrinsic judicial character" of the tasks assigned by Con-
gress to the Commission and the similarity between President Eisenhow-
er's reasons for dismissing Wiener and President Roosevelt's reasons for
dismissing Humphrey, the Court held that its decision was controlled by
Humphrey's Executor and the "nature of the office test" laid down in
that decision.
89. Concepts such as "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" soon
fail if taken as a strict litmus of the limits on the President's
removal power. Vast powers to promulgate rules and regulations accord-
ing to quasi-legislative procedures and vast powers to decide particular
cases according to quasi-judicial procedures have been given to the
President's cabinet. Yet, surely nothing said in Wiener or Humphrey's
Executor would suggest that Congress could prevent the President from
removing those officers. Particular officers are required to act in a
"quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" manner more as a result of pro-
cedural values -- principally due process -- than of anything that
speaks to the delineation of the relative powers of President and Con-
gress over the subject of removals. The key, therefore, is the "nature
of the office test." With that test, the whole subject was drawn into
a decisional paradigm quite alien to the theory that pervaded Myers. In
contrast to Chief Justice Taft's overarching and highly formalistic
scheme which classified all actions as "inherently" belonging to one de-
partment or another, Humphrey's Executor and Weiner are somewhat clumsy
responses to the realities of modern administrative government. That the
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If progress toward this point is slow in the later
removal cases, it is full ^and expressly accomplished
in United States v. Nixon and Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services. 9 1 If there is any doubt that the
89. (continued) rationale
chosen was somewhat inept does not gainsay the fact that the Court
was responding to the changing realities of modern administrative
government. It was searching for a means of drawing a line between
the needs of the President as perceived by 4ers and the needs of
Congress as reflected in those changing realities. Once this
occurred, once the Court acknowledged that its problem was one of
accommodating the conflicting claims of the executive and the Congress
in a new setting, it had embarked upon a doctrinal course totally
at odds with the older formalistic tradition of Myers. It had
all but expressly abandoned the theoretical teachings of that case.
90. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
91. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425
(1977), the Court upheld the validity of the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1976) against a claim
by former President Nixon that in providing for archival screening and
ultimate public access to presidential papers, the Act violated, inter
alia., the separation of powers doctrine. On this point, Justice Brennan
stated for the majority:
Appellant's argument is in any event based on an
interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine
inconsistent with the origins of that doctrine, re-
cent decisions of the Court, and the contemporary
realities of our political system. True, it has been
said that each of the three general departments of
government [must remain] entirely free from the con-
trol or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of
either of the others ...
But the more pragmatic, flexible approach of Madison
in the Federalist papers and later of Mr. Justice
Story was expressly affirmed by this Court only three
years ago in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
Although acknowledging that each branch of the
government has the duty, initially, to interpret the
Constitution for itself, and that its interpretation of
its powers is due great respect from the other branches,
418 U.S. at 703, the Court squarely rejected the argu-
ment that the Constitution contemplates a complete
division of authority between the three branches. Rather,
the unanimous Court essentially embraced Justice Jackson's
view expressed in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube .- v;-Sawyer-, 343 U.S. 579 635 (1952):
'In designing the structure of our Government and
dividing and allocating the sovereign power among
(VOL. 6
POWER TO TERMINATE TREATIES
Court's rejection of the Myers theoretical predicates
is applicable to the foreign affairs sphere, that doubt
can be laid to rest by examing a wider spectrum of
foreign affairs decisions. 9 2 The results reached in
those cases evince that larger concern for legitmacy --
for the political values and the practical sense of
effective governance -- that is the touchstone of the
Madisonian system of checks and balances. Out of these
decisions there also emerges a broader allocative pat-
tern of exclusive and shared powers wholly at odds with
the Court of Appeals decision. 9 3 That decision ignores
the development of the separation of powers doctrine
over the last fifty years, is at odds with most of the
major foreign policy opinions of the Supreme Court in
that same period, and has no parallel in the nearly
two hundred years of practical accommodation between
President and Congress on the matter of treaty ter-
minations. It is an unprincipled decision.
91. (continued)
the three coequal branches, the Framers of the
Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive
system, but the separate powers were not intended
to operate with absolute independence., 418 U.S. at 707
(emphasis supplied). Like the District Court, we there-
fore find that appellant's argument rests upon an 'archiac
view of the separation of powers as requiring three airtight
departments of government."' (See discussion of Youngstown
at note 126 infra and accompanying text).
92. See Part IV infra.
93. See Part III infra.
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4. The Core Theory and the Many Faces of Curtiss-Wright
Nothing underscores the last point more force-
fully than an analysis of the Court of Appeals' effort
to find support for its decision in Justice Sutherland's
famous dictum in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation.94 The point is a detour, but a necessary
one. No utterance by the Supreme Court has been so fre-
quently used by the Executive as a "dialectical weapon"
in its discourse with Congress concerning the allocation
of the foreign relations powers of the federal government.
No utterance has come to haunt the courts as regularly
as Justice Sutherland's somewhat exuberant rhetoric.
In Curtiss-Wright the defendant company sought to
overturn certain criminal indictments charg'ing it with
selling arms to the participants in the Chaco War in
violation of an executive proclamation. It argued that
the joint resolution of Congress upon which the Presi-
dent's proclamation was predicated constituted an unlaw-
ful delegation of legislative authority to the Executive.
In rejecting this contention, Justice Sutherland not
only concluded that the joint resolutionwas an entirely
valid exercise of the legislative power but that the
indic-tments could also be sustained as an exercise of:
the very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ
of the Federal Government in the field
of international relations -- a power
which does not require as a basis for
its exercise an act of Congress, but which,
of course, like every other governmental
power must be exercised in subordination
to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution. 95
It is notable that in quoting from this dictum, the
Court of Appeals omitted the Justice's adjectives --
"delicate, plenary and exclusive." 9 6 To the extent this
reflected a certain wariness, the court's caution was
well taken. It is far from clear what Justice Sutherland
94. 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
95. Id. at 320.
96. 617 F.2d at 707.
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had in mind. There are a host of interpretive questions,97
but the one that most concerns us can be put in the
following terms: Assume that the Justice did intend to
assign some prescriptive power to the President (i.e.,
that he was not speaking only of the President's pro-
secutorial powers) 9 8 and suppose that instead of passing a
resolution authorizing the prosecutions in question,
Congress had considered and expressly rejected the idea.
Did the Justice mean to imply that under these cir-
cumstances the President could have proceeded without
97. Did the Justice, for example, intend to attribute to the
President an authority to define as criminal under domestic law any
theretofore noncriminal act merely because that act affected the nation's
foreign relations? Alternatively, was the prescriptive power which
the Justice ascribed to the President limited solely to acts which
theretofore constituted violations of international law? If he is to
be read in this fashion, then perhaps he had no prescriptive power what-
soever in mind. This is especially possible since the Constitution
expressly confers upon Congress the power to "define and punish...
offenses against the Law of Nations." U.S. Const. art. I,sec. 8 cl. 10.
Perhaps, in other words, he is to be read as saying only that the Presi-
dent had a "plenary" prosecutorial power, which he could exercise in
that case without benefit of statute or joint resolution because arms
sales to the participants in the Chaco war constituted violations of
international law and, as such, were in the nature of common law
crimes under domestic law.
98. If the Justice, for example, meant only that the President,
in his prosecutorial capacity, (see note 97 supra) possessed a "plenary"
or "exclusive" power, the dictum is useless to the President. The
power to prosecute for established crimes is a power to carry forward,
or "execute," norms of conduct already laid down by some legislative
authority. It is not a presciptive power in the sense of a power to
define new norms of conduct. Treaty termination, on the other hand, in-
variably involves adoption of new norms -- of either international law
or domestic law, or both. If the act of terminating a treaty, however,
is not more than simple obedience to an antecedent decision by the
statute or even treaty-makers (e.g., termination precipitated by the
enactment of a later and inconsistent statute), then termination only
serves proprlta vigore to adopt new norms of international law.
In this case, the authority to terminate can readily be likened
to the prosecutorial power. It is a means of giving international
effect to an antecedent domestic legislative decision. In President
Carter's case, however, this action in terminating the Mutual Defense
Treaty rested upon no such antecedent legislative decision. It
rested solely upon his own conclusion that termination was in the
national interest. It was prescriptive in the broadest sense of
creating a new normative regime governing United States' relations
with Taiwan. Plainly, such an act can draw no support from Justice
Sutherland, if interpreted as referring solely to the President's
prosecutorial function.
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regard to the congressional will? Or did he only in-
tend to ascribe to the President power to act so long
as the statute- or treaty-makers had remained silent?
Was he speaking only of an interstitial prescriptive
power?
First, note should be taken of the context in
which the statement appears. It was offered as
support for a decision validating a congressional re-
solution upon which the President had relied. It would
seem a bit strained to suggest that the Justice ex-
pressly had in mind a situation in which the President
sought to ignore or override a congressional decision.
Context suggests that he was speaking only of an
interstitial prescriptive power. Read in this fashion,
the dictum constitutes a very modest and readily de-
fensible extension of the law found in a long and re-
spectable line of authority. 99 But if this is the proper
interpretation of the Justice's statement, it is of no
assistance to the Court of Appeals. As the historical
record shows, circumstances can arise in which treaty
termination may be analogized to an act of interstitial
law-making. I 00 In sharp contrast to those historical
examples, however, 101 President Carter in the Taiwan
situation was claiming a power to override an otherwise
completely viable treaty policy relying upon nothing
more than his personal vision of the national interest.
Even more telling, the Court of Appeals itself ad-
mitted that, if read to endow the President with power
to override the expressed will of the statute or treaty-
makers, the dictum would be incredible. Justice Suther-
land, it must be remembered, was not speaking of the
President's power in relationship to treaties. He was
concerned with the power to make domestic criminal law.
To conclude, therefore, that the Justice was asserting
a presidential power to override the congressional will
on such a matter, is tantamount to saying that the
President could repeal any foreign affairs statute he
chose anytime he chose to do so. As this was precisely the
idea the Court of Appeals was at great pains to deny,102
one ought not to attribute the thought to Justice buther-
land unless compelled by his language to do so. Such a
99. See cases discussed infra Part IV.
100. See Part III infra.
101. See notes 182 and 186 infra and accompanying text.
102. 617 F.2d at 707.
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reading would constitute a total repudiation of the
separation of powers doctrine and of the political
values that underlie that precept. Indeed, if read
in this broad fashion, a strong case can be made for
the conclusion that the dictum has been overruled by
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v, Sawyer,103 Finally,
if Justice Sutherland's dictum is supportive of Presi-
dent Carter only when read in this improbable, if not
incredible fashion, that fact tends to underscore how
very far the Court of Appeals strayed from established
principles in upholding the President.
103. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See note 136 infra,
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Ill
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY POWERS:
A GENERAL DESIGN
It is not enough to state the case against the Presi-
dent and the Court of Appeals negatively. The case must
be affirmatively placed within that larger design that
has developed through the decided cases in keeping with
the basic political values and practical scheme of govern-
ment embodied in the separation of powers doctrine. A-
part from his vast powers of initiative and administration,
two basic principles establish the larger pattern of the
President's power over foreign relations whenever he
purports to act with "legal effect." This includes
situations in which he issues commands binding upon the
civil and military officers of the government in the. per-
formance of their duties.
1 0 4
The first, and most fundamental precept is that
the President must act in obedience to and in furtherance
of the policies which reflect the expressed will of the
statute- or treaty-makers. If he takes the initiative
to change the statute- or treaty-maker's policy, the
104. We are not unmindful of possible and subtle distinctions,
illustrated by Consumer Union of United States v. Kissinger, 506 F. 2d
136 (D.C. Cir. 1975), between presidential acts that have legal effect
and acts of a different order. In that case, the executive branch
undertook to limit imports by sponsoring a series of "self imposed
limitation" by foreign producers. While statutes existed empower-
ing the President to limit imports for the general purposes he
was otherwise attempting to achieve, the Executive eschewed reliance
upon those statutes because their procedures were too cumbersome.
In spite of the fact that the undertakings were rather clearly
induced by various Executive representatives, the court refused to
declare the Executive's actions unconstitutional because it deemed
the unilaterial private undertakings legally "unenforceable." This
problem, however, certainly does not arise in our situation. The
act of terminating a treaty has legal effect in every sense. It
negates obligations that woUIld otherwise be binding upon the sovereign
United States under international law. If the terms of a treaty are
invoked as rules of decision in a court of law, the act of terminating
the treaty definitively bars a decision predicated upon those terms.
More affirmatively, the termination of a treaty brings into exist-
ence a new normative regime, whether embodied in customary international
law, in an antecedent and subsisting statute or in common law.
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Congress or Senate must, at some appropriate point,
concur in the change. Far from depending upon the
supremacy clause, this basic principle is based squarely
upon the higher order of legitimacy that generally attaches
to the concurrent will of President and Congress (the
statute-makers) or President and Senate (the treaty-makers).
For purposes of this precept it is totally irrelevant that
the question of policy pertains to the performance by the
President of a function in which Congress is not expressly
given the authority to participate.105
There are, however, exceptions to this basic prin-
ciple. Our constitutional scheme is not blind to the
practical needs of the President in discharging his office
effectively. Nor is it blind to the fact that exigen-
cies can arise under which too rigorous an adherence to
our democratic postulates and too zealous a regard for
our liberties could leave the nation impotent to de-
fend either. For example, the Congress cannot, by statute,
encroach upon the President's right to remove those high
officers of the executive branch through whom he must
conduct diplomacy, or deny him the right to appoint
9pecial agents for that purpose. !0 6 Doubtless he possesses
a broad privilege immune from legislative restraint to
control the disclosure, even to Congress, of executive
documents and other communications pertaining to foreign
affairs.1 0 7 History seems to have established a com-
parable rule with regard to the recognition power.1 08
While debatable, it is also possible to argue that the
value calculus of checks and balances may merit the im-
position of limits upon the power of Congress to restrict
105. The very fact of a government with separate departments
means that the Executive is called upon to perform many functions in
which Congress is not required to participate or cannot do so (e.g., the
prosecution of law suits, the negotiation of agreements, the giving of
notice terminating a treaty, commanding the nation's forces in battle).
If a policy embodied in a statute or treaty were dependent for execu-
tion upon an express grant to Congress of the right to participate in
each of the particular Executive functions to which that policy might be
relevant, statutes and treaties would scarcely ever by obeyed. The
confusion between instrumental function and policy-making to which the
Court of Appeals succumbed simply has no place in our constitutional
thought.
106. This much is left from the teachings of Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935) and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1957).
See note 89 supra.
107. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
108. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 204 (1924).
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the President's emergency war powers or his authority
to withdraw American forces from active hostilities.I 0 9
The cases from which these examples are drawn
illustrate the broader analytic mode which, under the
separation of powers doctrine, must guide the resolution
of all basic questions concerning the allocation of
constitutional powers. These authorities also under-
score how far Goldwater, when tested by that mode,
stands removed trom this important, but limited, sphere
of exclusive presidential authority.110
The second major postulate of the broader design
is that, outside the limited area of his exclusive
powers, the President possesses a potentially ex-
pansive independent power to act with "legal effect"
so long as the statute and treaty-makers have remained
silent. While the boundaries of this interstitial power
have never been fully explored by the decided cases, the
specific enumerations of Article II have thus far proved
wholly adequate to the purpose. The President has needed
no assistance from some vague notion of "inherent" power
derived from the executive power clause.
Principal among the sources of this interstitial
power is the Take Care clause, often cited as a source
of presidential law-making authority, notwithstanding
the absence of an antecedent statute or treaty.II I
Likewise, the President, as commander-in-chief, possesses
substantial power to expose and even commit the nation
to armed conflict without benefit of a congressional
declaration or authorization.11 2 The "organ" function
is somewhat different. As a source of the President's
powers of initiative, its scope is extensive. By ex-
pressing the attitudes, the inclinations, and expectations
of the United States, often with portents of future action,
the President can decisively shape the course of relation-
ships with a foreign power and narrow the effective scope
of congressional discretion when the decision comes under
its scrutiny. But as a source of authority to act with
binding "legal effect" it is probably of minimal
significance. If Justice Sutherland's Curtiss-Wright
dictum is to be assigned any analytically defensible
109. See discussion Part IV.
110. See discussion Part IV.
111. See discussion beginning at note 123 infra and accompanying
text.
112. See discussion beginning at note 144 infra and accompanying
text.
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significance, it is as authority for this last point.
1 13
Still, there are exceptions to this precept; sub-
jects upon which the President possesses no power what-
ever to act with legal effect except with congressional
or senatorial concurrence. Long tradition, and some
authority,11 4 hold that neither treaties nor, a fort-ori,
executive agreements, may serve in lieu of a statute as
the basis for a criminal prosecution or for the withdrawal
from the Treasury of funds needed to carry out the
agreement. It is quite clear that, as commander-in-
chief, there are limits beyond which the President can-
not commit the nation to war without an express con-
gressional authorization.1 1 5 Even though subject to
serious question, recurrent dicta suggest that the
President cannot, by executive agreement or unilateral
act, effectively regulate commerce with a foreign ation
without statutory authorization or ratification.I 1
Finally, it would be a mistake to assume that the
President acts without practical constraint in that
vast diplomatic realm where, as "organ" of the nation,
he can often shape our relations with foreign govern-
ments and create that "antecedent state of things"
which circumscribes Congress in the exercise of its
judgment.
Once again, in both the grant of and limitations upon
this interstitial power, one can observe the workings of
the Madisonian conception of the separation of powers
doctrine. There is a search for a workable balance between
effective governance on the one hand and the preservation
of liberty and democratic values on the other. There is
also a recognition that the President has a national con-
stituency and that each of the substantive enumerations
of Article II, unlike the executive power clause, possesses
its basis of legitimacy, albeit more attenuated than that
which congressional concurrence might supply. Nor is
the system unmindful of the fact that, in a large,
heterogenous democracy which at times exhibits a certain
penchant for chaos in its deliberative processes, there
is a need for leadership. Persuasion, not naked power,
is the weapon we expect our leaders to use. But we will
not deny power when the more open deliberative processes
113. See discussion Part II (4).
114. See cases cited at note 55 supra.
115. See note 147 infra and accompanying text.
116. See cases discussed at notes 56 and 58 supra.
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of Congress have proved indifferent or too chaotic or
fractionalized to reach a decision.
So it is that under the Take Care clause, the
President, in acting without benefit of statute or
treaty, must invoke broader policies and objectives
reflected in related statutes or treaties, conform to
the postulates of customary international law, or act
to preserve the structure of the nation's established
international relationships. Indeed, there is some-
thing eminently measured and sensible in allowing the
President to act without invariably referring to
Congress matters where speed and confidentiality may
be essential. It must be remembered, however, that he
is always subordinate to Congress should it choose to
act, either with his concurrence or over his veto.
As commander-in-chief the President may draw on
necessity as the great legitimator of his independent
power. But those powers are not unlimited. Without
attempting any refinement of the subject, the limits
implicit in the definition of the theater of war and
of the circumstances under which he may commit troops
to active hostilities reflect a point at which necessity
must give way to the demand for a broader consensus
before calling upon the nation to make the extraordinary
sacrifices which war may require.
The fact that the President may not expend money
from the Treasury without benefit of an appropriations
statute is not only a response to an explicit constit-
utional command1 1 7 but a linchpin of our system. It
is probably the single most important factor assuring
that the general scheme of the Constitution is, in
fact, adhered to in the day-to-day conduct of di-
plomacy. The requirement of a statutory predicate for
criminal prosecutions, reflects the fact, in light of
our commitment to personal liberty and the rule of law,that
any decision that may lead to the imprisonment of an
individual must proceed from a concurrent will of
President and Congress, including the latter's more
popular branch.
How, then, does the problem of treaty termination
fit within this larger design? In the improbable event
of a treaty, rather than executive agreement, on a sub-
ject within his exclusive sphere, the President could,
117. U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 9, cl. 7.
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of course, terminate that treaty.
Apart from this eccentric possibility, however,
one must begin fitting the treaty termination pro-
blem into the larger design of the President's powers
by recognizing again that all self-executing treaties
perform a dual role. They are sources of domestic law
addressed to judges, to the Executive, occasionally to
private individuals, and possibly even to the Congress.l 18
They also prescribe rules of conduct binding upon the
sovereign United States under international law. Be-
cause of this dual role, situations may arise where
the two facets of a treaty diverge. The classic ex-
ample, of course, is the case where the treaty as a
rule of domestic law has been superceded by a subse-
quently enacted statute. In responding to the result-
ing divergence, the courts have placed themselves under
a constitutional obligation to follow the latest ex-
pression of the legislative will1 19 and, as a corollary,
have required the President to use his powers as the
"organ" of the nation to end the divergence by termin-
ating or abrogating the treaty.1 2 0 This constitutes
one example of a situation where the President may in-
deed terminate a treaty without reference to either
Congress or Senate precisely because he is powerless
either to ignore or override a statute or later treaty.
On the other hand, cases will also arise where the
treaty text, in both its domestic and international
effects, is the final and authoritative statement of the
law. Because the President cannot ignore or override
the treaty-makers, he is constitutionally prohibited
from terminating the treaty without congressional or
senatorial concurrence.
Between these extremes, a number of situations can
arise. There may be situations in which the basic di-
rection and objectives of American foreign policy, as
embodied in subsequently enacted statute or treaty, are
substantially at odds with the policy of an earlier treaty,
even though, technically, adherence to one need not give
rise to a violation of the other. It can be said that
both the international and domestic law effects of the
118. See note 66 supra.
119. See cases cited at note 172 infra.
120. See note 172 infra and accompanying text.
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earlier treaty are out of line with the latest ex-
pression of policy by the statute- or treaty-makers,
Here the President can be viewed-as empowered to bring
the earlier treaty regime into conformity with that
policy by terminating the treaty. That the President
may act without reference to Congress would seem a
modest extension of his power to terminate treaties
that have been superceded by subsequently enacted
statutes.
Also, a foreign government may breach a treaty
under circumstances which, according to international
law, results in the United States having the choice of
either terminating the treaty or "waiving" the breach
and treating the agreement as a continuing obligation
of both parties. Here, the President's authority can
be analyzed in either of two ways. He can be said to
possess an independent authority to make that choice,
so long as his choice can be justified by reference
to the policies and objectives that underlay the
original decision to make the treaty. Tested by this
standard, the President's authority would seem indis-
tinguishable from the power, noted above, to conform
an earlier treaty regime to the broader policies and
objectives of a later enacted statute or treaty.
Alternatively, breach of the treaty by the other
party and possibly the occurrence of other events out-
side the control of either President or Congress may
be analyzed as creating a situation so distinct from
that which obtained when the treaty was made as to
constitute a new problem which can be characterized
in either of two ways. One can say that, had they con-
templated these new circumstances the original treaty-
makers would not have entered into the treaty. More
modestly, one might conclude that a new situation has
arisen with regard to which the treaty-makers have ex-
pressed no policy. Termination under the first char-
acterization can be thought of as designed to bring
the international legal obligations of the United
States into conformity with the latest, albeit presumed,
intention of the treaty-makers' will. If characterized
as a situation with regard to which the treaty-makers
have expressed no policy, granting the President
independent power to terminate the treaty could be
justified as an exercise of his interstitial power to
act with "legal effect," provided the subject matter
involved is not one upon which congressional concurrence
is otherwise required.
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The greatest difficulty with both of these char-
acterizations lies in identifying the events that warrant
their use. And this difficulty can be especially
problematic since it is cases in which these charac-
terizations must be used that reach to the farthest
boundaries of an independent presidential power.
When, aided by a few judicial decisions, this
analytic structure is superimposed upon the historical
record of independent executive treaty terminations,
several conclusions emerge. The vast bulk of these
cases reside comfortably within our several modest
extensions of the President's power to terminate
those treaties that are inconsistent with a subsequently
enacted statute. 1 21 In only a few instances is it
necessary to push to the very boundaries of the Presi-
denfs power under this line of analysis. Admittedly,
some of these cases stand at the outer limits of that
boundary. In the contrast between these latter cases
and President Carter's action, however, one can see
quite vividly how far the President strayed beyond the
limits of his constitutional authority.
121. See, e.g., note 178 infra and text accompanying note 179
infra.
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IV
A WIDER SURVEY OF CASES: THE TAKE CARE
CLAUSE AND THE WAR POWERS
In addition to the decisions already noted and
others reviewed in the context of the historical re-
cord, two further lines of authority are particularly
helpful in completing our brief sketch of the presi-
dential powers because they are based on the Take Care
clause and the war powers. The first line consists of
the decisions that culminated in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Company v. Sawyer,12 2 the celebrated Steel Seizure
Case.
The line begins with Little v, Barreme
I23 in which
Chief Justice Marshall struck a note that echoes through-
out our constitutional history. In the absence of a
statute or treaty, the Take Care clause is an independent
source of presidential power. In the presence of a
statute or treaty, however, the clause constitutes a
limitation upon presidential power.
1 24
Little was followed in In re Naqel 125 which not
only affirmed the dual function of the Take Care clause,
but underscored the potentially expansive character of
that clause as a source of presidential power where
Congress has remained silent. 1 2 6 The Court held that
122. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
123. 6 U.s. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
124. The Court concluded that the captain of a U.S. naval vessel
which had seized a Danish merchantman while the latter was outbound
from a French port, was liable to the Danish owners because the
seizure violated a statute under which only vessels "bound or sailing
to" such a port could be seized. This conclusion was reached, however,
only after Chief Justice Marshall conceded that the President, whose
"high duty it is to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed'
and is Commander-in-Chief. . . might without Congressional authority
in the then existing state of things have authorized the action taken."
Id. But Congress had made its will plain and the captain of the naval
vessel could not escape liability for violating that will merely be-
cause he had followed the President's orders.
125. 135 U.S. 1 (1889).
126. Nagel had been jailed and charged by the State of California
for a murder allegedly committed while guarding Mr. Justice Field while
the latter was on circuit. The issue was whether Nagel might have habeas
coxrpus under a statute requiring that he be "in custody for an act done
or omitted in pursuance of the law of the United States." There was,
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the President's "duty" under the clause was not:
limited to the enforcement of acts
of Congress or of treaties of the
United States according to their
expressed terms. [It] includes the
rights, duties and obligations grow-
ing out of the Constitution itself,
our international relations, and all
of the protection implied by the
nature of the government under the
Constitution. 127
The notion of a power to enforce the "rights, duties
and obligations growing out . . of [the nation's]
international relations and [out of] the protection im-
plied by the nature of the government" certainly attributes
to the Take Care clause a flexible and potentially ex-
pansive capability. Equally important, the structure of
the opinion is transparent. When considering the case
as though Congress had been silent, the Court adopts an
expansive view of the President's powers. Once a statute
is introduced, however, the opinion shifts completely
into the interpretive mode. 12 8 A similar pattern has,
from the beginning, dominated the work of the courts on
foreign policy as well as domestic cases, the most
notable modern example being the Steel Seizure1 29 decision.
There the Secretary of Commerce had taken over the manage-
ment of the nation's steel mills because, according to the
President, a threatened strike would have shut those mills
down and threatened the flow of war material to our
forces in Korea. In upholding an injunction against the
Secretary, Justice Black, writing for the Court, char-
acterized the President's action as a clear and unequivocal
act of "lawmaking. "1 3 0 Whether this implied that the
126. (continued)
the State argued, no federal statute in existence empowering U.S. Marshald
to protect the justices of the Supreme Court. Accepting the State's con-
tention, arguendo, the Court, without reference to any "inherent" power in
the Executive, responded by relying upon the Take Care clause. Id.
127. 135 U.S. at 64.
128. This is apparent from the care with which the Court documented
its conclusion that Nagel's actions did indeed fall within the powers
granted to U.S. Marshals by statute. Id. at 69.
129. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
130. Id. at 588.
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President invariably required a statutory warrant
for actions not within his powers as commander-in-chief
is unclear.1 3 1 Congress had, in fact, legislated on
the subject. The President had not complied with the
authority given to him because it was too cumbersome
and Congress had expressly refused to grant a broader
authority.
It is precisely this last point which led Justice
Clark,1 3 2 in his concurring opinion, to conclude that
the case was controlled by Little v. Barreme.
1 3 3
Implicit in all the opinions of the Court, including
Chief Justice Vinson's dissent, is a clear-cut rejection
of the government's argument that the President possessed
an "inherent" power to do what had to be done to meet
the emergency at hand.
If there was no such "inherent" power to meet the
exigencies of war, one could scarcely argue a broader
"inherent" power over all foreign relations. This logic
applies to Goldwater because Steel Seizure involved
foreign affairs.1 3 4  Indeed, if, as in Curtiss-Wright, 1 3 5
the prosecution of an American company in an American
court for a violation of domestic law constituted a
foreign relations matter because the crime charged in-
volved the shipment of unwanted goods abroad, then
plainly the seizure in America of American property in
order to assure the supply of needed goods abroad was
equally a foreign relations question. If one compares
the foreign policy stakes at issue in the two cases,
Curtiss-Wright pales to insignificance. This point was
131. The Justice expressly considered and rejected the
contention that the President's action fell within his powers as
Commander-in-Chief. Id.at 587.
132. Id . at 660.
133. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
134. The Government sought to show that the President had
acted in furtherance of our obligations under the United Nations
Charter. 343 U.S. at 668. And there were sworn statements from the
cabinet purporting to prove the disastrous effects a continued steel
strike would have had on the strategic interests of the United States
in both the Far East and Europe. Id. at 678.
135. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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inadvertantly but rather dramatically illustrated by
Attlee v. Laird.1 3o Moreover, in light of the record,
it would have been a dereliction of duty for the Supreme
Court to have treated the case as a wholly domestic mat-
ter if the President had an "inherent" power over foreign
affairs that was adequate to sustain his action. The
Steel Seizure decision stands, in short, as an author-
itative denial of any broad "inherent" power over
foreign policy that would permit the President to ignore
or override the statute or treaty-maker's will.
This last point emerges most clearly in a compar-
ison of Justice Jackson's concur ing opinion 1 3 7 and
Chief Justice Vinson's dissent. "  Justice Jackson
commences with words that deserve repeating, words that
speak with a peculiar relevance to our present problem:
That comprehensive and undefined Presi-
dential powers hold both practical dd-
vantages and grave dangers for the country
will impress anyone who has served as legal
advisor to a President in time of tran-
sition and public anxiety. While an inter-
val of detached reflection may temper teach-
ings of that experience they probably are
a more realistic influence on my views
than the conventional materials of
judicial decision. . . But as we approach
136. 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 411 U.S. 911
(1973). In Attlee the court recognized that the Steel Seizure decision
was something of an embarrassment to its conclusion that all the issues
involved in the challenge to the Vietnam war were non-justiciable. It,
therefore, sought to distinguish the Steel Seizure decision as essen-
tially a domestic case in which the "effect on the foreign relations of
this country. . .if any. . .would have been clearly minimal compared to
the drastic change which nationalization by the President would other-
wise have brought about in the free enterprise system." 347 F. Supp.
at 701, 702. This, the Attlee court asserted, was in sharp contrast to
the situation in Curtiss-Wright, which dealt with a critical foreign
policy matter: the efforts of the President "to ease the tensions in
the Chaco."
The comparison is surely eccentric. Somehow Attlee seems to
have demonstrated rather nicely the futility of trying to insulate the
rhetorical tradition from the embarrassments of the Steel Seizure deci-
sion.
137. 343 U.S. at 634.
138. Id. at 634.
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the question of Presidential power,
we may overcome mental hazards by
recognizing them. The opinions
of judges, no less than executives
and publicists, often suffer the
infirmity of confusing the issue
of a power's validity with the
cause it is invoked to promote, of
confounding the permanent executive
office with its temporary occupant.
The tendency is strong to emphasize
transient results upon policy. .
and lose sight of enduring con-
sequences upon the balanced power
structure of our republic.
1 39
Justice Jackson then relegated the "inherent" powers
notion to the realm of rhetoric;1 4 0 -- a "dialectical
weapon" which prudence might advise withholding from any
serious judicial test.
The lesson is clear. The President's power to seize
the steel mills, if it existed at all, was to be found
solely within the textual enumerations of Article II.
The Justice searches and finds each wanting although he
is quite prepared, as part of his famous threefold divis-
ion of the presidental powers, 1 4 1 to admit that there
may be a "zone of twilight" in which congressional
"inertia, indifference or quiescence" may sometimes "en-
able, if not invite, measures on independent Presidential
responsibility. "142
It is precisely upon this last point that Chief
Justice Vinson builds his long dissent. 1 4 3 Congress had
not foreclosed seizure in the case of labor disputes
handled under the Defense Production Act. The Taft-Hartley
history was not controlling. Moreover, according to
139. d. at 634.
140. 3ee note 75 suprc and accompanying text.
141. (i) When the President acts pursuant to a congressional
authorization, or (ii) when, relying upon his "owm independent
powers," he acts in the "absence of either a Congressional grant or
denial of authority"; or (iii) when he "takes measures incompatible
with the . . . will of Congress." The third type of action could,
the Justice asserted, be sustained by the courts only "by disabling
Congress from acting upon the subject." 343 U.S. at 635-38.
142. Id. at 637.
143. Id. at 701.
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the Chief Justice, a broad foundation for action under
the Take Care clause had been laid in our treaty
obligations, the several United Nations resolutions
relating to the Korean War, and the "mass" of legislation
passed by Congress in furtherance of the war effort.
Justice Douglas's contention that, on the subject of
property seizures, the Take Care clause was not
enough is met by citations to Little v. Barreme and In
re Nagel, Throughout it all, the Chief Justice utters
not one word of support for the government's "inherent"
powers argument. To the contrary, he repeatedly em-
phasizes that his case for the President rests squarely
upon the specific enumerations of Article II.
Equally important, it seems plain that the Chief
Justice would have prevailed had Congress remained silent
on the point rather than considering and rejecting the
use of seizures as a device for settling labor disputes.
The dissenters (the Chief Justice, and Justices Reed and
Minton) would certainly have been joined by Justices
Burton and Clark. The same is almost certainly true
of Justices Jackson and Frankfurther. Only Justice
Douglas would clearly have remained unpersuaded, though
the same is probably true of Justice Black. The de-
cision is a primary illustration of a larger con-
stitutional design integrating presidential subordin-
ation to the statute-and treaty-makers with a potentially
expansive interstitial power to act independently where
the latter have remained silent.
The Steel Seizure decision leads directly into a
second line of important cases, those dealing with the
President's war powers. We need go no further than the
spate of circuit court decisions dealing with various
challenges to the war in Southeast Asia. In all these
cases the issues raised were whether the President could
constitutionally involve the nation in one or more phases
of the Vietnam conflict without some congressional
authorization and whether he had actually received the
authority that was constitutionally required.
In the earliest decisions, thi questions were
summarily declared nonjusticiable.1  Later, however,
all of the circuits that had an opportunity to review
the problem (First, Second, and District of Columbia)
144. Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F. 2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Mora v.
McNamara, 387 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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were prepared to treat the challenges as justiciable
to the point where they could conclude that some con-
gressional authorization was in fact given. Having
come this far,1 4 5 they, with one exception,1 4 6 stead-
fastly refused to intrude further. They held that
questions concerning the proper form of the authorization
(a formal declaration versus various statutes and re-
solutions) or the precise scope of the hostilities
authorized were nonjusticiable.
While, in these decisions, the discussion of the
President's powers invariably occurs in the context
of the political question doctrine, the courts, in
passing upon their own competence to decide whether
congressional assent was constitutionally necessary,
consistently made plain their disposition on the merits
of that question. The Vietnam hostilities had reached
a point where, without some form of congressional
sanction, the President would have exceeded his con-
stitutional authority. If in some cases this was,
strictly speaking, dictum, it was as close to a holding
as dictum can get.
In upholding the trial court's denial of a temporary
injunction, the Second Circuit in Burke v. Laird14 7 was
confronted at the threshold with the government's con-
tention, based upon Curtiss-Wrightl 4 8 that the President's
power as commander-in-chief was "co-extensive" with his
powers over foreign policy and that the latter was a
"unitary" power which encompassed the whole of the nation's
foreign relations. Therefore, the government argued, any
judicial inquiry into the President's actions in Vietnam
would be "second guessing" a political decision. The
appeals court quickly disposed of this argument. The
argument would mean that the enumerated powers of Congress--
in this instance the power to "declare war"--were an
145. Having come this far, the question they faced was immediate-
ly transformed. By their owm admission, the courts no longer confronted
a policy decision upon which Congress and the President were at odds
or upon which Congress had remained silent. They confronted a policy
upon which Congress and the President were largely in accord. Recogni-
tion of this fact was an important consideration in their refusal to
probe further.
146. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
147. 429 F. 2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
148. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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"antique formality.''1 49 The idea is contrary to
both the intent of the framers and the history of the
subject. "Orders to fight," the court concluded, at
least in some circumstances, could be issued only
under the "proper authorization of both branches."
This being so, there was, at least at the threshold, a
"judicially identifiable duty" which could be ju-
dicially enforced, i.e., a justiciable question. 1 50
In Massachusetts v. Laird,151 the First Circuit
turned to the constitutional text to determine whether,
in alleging that a formal congressional declaration was
necessary, petitioner had raised a question "textually
committed" to the political departments. From its
exegesis upon that text the court concluded that:
[Iun giving some essential powers to
Congress and others to the executive
[the Constitution textually] committed
the matter [of conducting undeclared
wars beyond emergency defense] to both
branches whose joint concord precludes
the judiciary from measuring a specific
executive action against any specific
clause in isolation. 152
Immediately, however, the court recognized that it had
all but decided the question on the merits. Forthrightly,
it pushed on to restate the conclusion:
All we hold here is that in a situation
of prolonged but undeclared hostilities,
where the Executive continues to act not
149. 429 F.2d at 305.
150. This aspect of the first Burke decision was reaffirmed when
later the Second Circuit upheld the denial of a permanent injunction
because the trial court correctly found that Congress' duty "of mutual
participation in the prosecution of war" had been satisfied. (Orlando
v. Laird, 443 E 2d 1039, 1040 (2d Cir. 1971)). At no time did the
Second Circuit deviate from this basic principle even when, in later
cases, it dismissed a number of attacks on the war based upon repeal
of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (Da Costa v. Laird, 448 F. 2d 1368 (2d
Cir. 1971)). the mining of the harbors in North Vietnam (Da Costa v.
Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973)) and the Cambodian incursion
(Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 (3d Cir. 1973)).
151. 451 F. 2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971).
152. Id. at 33.
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only in the absence of any conflict-
ing Congressional claim of authority,
but with steady Congressional support,
the Constitution has not been breached....
Should either branch be opposed to the
continuance of hostilities, however,
and present the issue in clear terms,
a court might well take a different
view. 153
If the absence of congressional support could yield a
"different view" on the constitutionality of an un-
declared war, surely the necessity of such support
becomes something more than a vaguely implied require-
ment.
Finally, there is the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals' own decision in Mitchell v. Laird.
1 54
After deciding that it was competent to consider whether
the President was constitutionally bound to obtain Con-
gress' approval of the hostilities in Vietnam, the court
declined to answer directly the question on its merits.
It turned instead to consider whether Congress had in
fact given its approval. One judge concluded that it
had. The majority thought that the relevant congressional
enactments could not serve "as a valid assent to the
Vietnam war."1 55 Then rather than going back to decide
on the merits whether a valid assent was even necessary,
the court noted that President Nixon, having inherited
the Vietnam war, had declared his intention to bring it
to an end. Absent a showing of presidential bad faith,
the court concluded that it could not judge the means
or timing selected by the President in bringing about
this result. 1 56 Surely, the use of such a rationale all
but explicitly confirms that, but for the special
context, the President could no longer have prosecuted
the war because he lacked the requisite congressional
assent.
In sum, the law today would seem to be as clear
as circuit unanimity without express Supreme Court
affirmation can make it. Whatever actions a President
153. Id. at 34.
154. 488 F. 2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
155. Id. at 615.
156. Id. at 616.
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might independently take as commander-in-chief, there
is a point, measured by the nature and duration of the
hostilities, beyond which he cannot commit the nation
to active fighting without an affirmative congressional
warrant unless those hostilities have their origin in
emergency circumstances. Emergencies aside, war is
a question upon which the President cannot act in the
interstices of the congressional will whether as
commander-in-chief or under the Take Care clause.
Moreover, if we read the Steel Seizure majority
correctly,1 57 this lack of power to conduct actual
hostilities contrasts with the power to seize private
property in support of an authorized war. That such a
line can be drawn illustrates how thoroughly our
constitutional scheme is rooted in the search for a
workable balance between governmental efficacy and
our democratic postulates, between a protection of the
collective welfare and the preservation of individual
liberty. It is scarcely credible that such a system
could vest in its executive arm, which controls virtually
all the levers of governmental power, an unlimited
"inherent" power to act merely because the subject
of the action touches upon foreign relations.
To these cases we need append only a brief note
regarding such decisions as Reid v, Covert 1 5 8 and
United States ex rel. Toth v, Quarles)1 5 9 in which
the Court struck down a number of congressionally
authorized executive agreements insofar as those agree-
ments called for civilian dependants of servicemen CReid)
or discharged servicemen (Toth) to be subject to trial by
courtmartial for crimes committed while stationed
abroad. Neither the Nation's defense nor its foreign
policy interests sufficed, the Court held, to warrant
denying the defendants their rights to a jury trial in
a civilian court upon the indictment of a grand jury.
It may be true that these cases dealt with the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights. But it would be anomalous to
suggest that if, after so thoughtfully seeking a work-
able balance between the collective will in foreign
affairs and the liberties of the individual as guaranteed
157. See discussion at note 146 supra and accompanying text.
158. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
159. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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by the Bill of Rights, the courts1 60  in
dealing with treaty terminations, could properly
abdicate all concern for checks and balances; that
they might suddenly and justifiably lose sight of
the fact that checks and balances are as much concerned
with the protection of individual rights as the Bill
of Rights, and could throw all of our basic democratic
postulates upon the mercy of a total preoccupation with
governmental efficacy.
Against the background of these cases we can
be far more precise in relating the power to terminate
treaties of alliance to Congress' war powers. Two
points set the stage. First, setting emergency cir-
cumstances aside, if a decision "for war" must command
the support of both President and Congress, it follows
that should Congress declare war by concurrent resolution,
the President, who has no constitutionally mandated
role in that decision, may refuse to commit American
forces to battle. His right of refusal is checks and
balances at work. Further, it may be that this power
of refusal persists even if Congress acts by statute
or joint resolution, including a statute or resolution
passed over the President's veto. Arguendo, we concede
the point. For analytic purposes, we assume that war,
with its portent of great sacrifice by the citizenry
and its dangers to liberty, requires the continuous
concurrence of both President and Congress and that the
President can withdraw his concurrence at any time by
160. For a wider perspective on this process see Stotzky & Swan,
Due Process Methodology and Prisoner Exchange Treaties: Con-
fronting an Uncertain Calculus, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 733 (1978); see also
Ex Porte Quirin 317 U.S. 1 (1942) and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)
upholding a Presidential order establishing military commissions for
the trial of certain persons accused of violating the laws of war,
insofar as Congress had authorized the President's actions. The Court
also held, however, that as applied to commissions sitting in
United States territory, the President's order barring civilian
court review of the commission decisions could not foreclose review
upon habeas coxpus. Only in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1959), did the Court say that, since the habeas statutes did not
expressly cover the case, the writ would not lie to review commissions
established to try enemy aliens outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States. Yet, paradoxically the Court did in fact re-
view the merits of the commission's decision much as it would had
its jurisdiction in habeas been established. See also Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
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terminating hostilities.
The second preliminary point concerns the terms of
our Mutual Defense treaties. The Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States and Taiwan is typical.
As noted, that agreement imposes upon the sovereign
United States an unqualified (i.e., self-executing)
international legal obligation to judge in good faith
whether an attack on Taiwan impairs the security of
the treaty area. 161 Any impairment of the latter is,
under the language of the treaty, deemed to impair the
security of the United States as well. 1 62 But the
treaty also makes plain that the good faith judgment 163
called for is to be made by constitutional procedures.
Accordingly, under the hypothesis that the power to
decide "for war" is a shared power, the language of the
treaty would seem to signify the following results. So
long as both Congress and the President adhere to the
good-faith standard of the treaty, Congress could not
command the President to respond to an attack on Taiwan
if the President judged the response unwarranted under
the treaty criteria. Conversely, the President could
not unilaterally respond if Congress refused to concur.
In neither event could the United States be held
to have violated its international legal obligations.
But, if this is so, parallel reasoning suggests that if
either department may, by withholding its concurrence,
foreclose the other department from pursuing a decision
"for war," either department may terminate any treaty that
might precipitate the need to confront such a decision.
The logic may be sound, but to qualify as the basis
for a general right in the President to terminate any
treaty of alliance, it must posit that the existence
of an alliance invariably increases the prospects for
war and that a decision to terminate an alliance
invariably distangles the nation from that prospect.
The premise, of course, contradicts the fact that
the treaty-makers uniformly thought of our
alliances as a deterrent to war. Also, all of our
mutual security agreements, including the Mutual Defense
Treaty, constitute parts in a larger network of under-
takings, each limiting the freedom that the President
161. See note 67 sup2a.
162. See Article V of the Mutual Defense Treaty quoted at note
65 supra.
163. See note 67 supra.
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and Congress would otherwise have had in deciding how
to respond to an attack on our ally. This network was
constructed in the firm belief that a series of such
self-denying ordinances offered the best prospect for
never having to face the necessity of the decision
which we undertook to make. Lastly, it is deceptive
to think that because termination will free the United
States from its legal obligation to defend a former
ally, termination will change the necessity for that
defense. By their own terms, our alliances are rooted
in the perception that the security of a treaty partner
is related to our own security. While a change in that
perception might warrant terminating a treaty, termin-
ation per se does not change either the perception or
the underlying reality.
More generally then, so long as one works, as the
law must, within the framework of the assumptions and
objectives laid down by the treaty-makers, one is com-
pelled to conclude that if the termination of any one
treaty removes an important deterrent to an attack on
the treaty partner or on any other nation with whom we
remain allied, the termination can be characterized as
a step away from war only if accompanied by a change in
the perceived probabilities of such an attack or in the
attack's perceived threat to our own security. If
unaccompanied by such change, the decision must be
characterized as potentially entangling1 64 the United
States in our former allies' affairs in all the more
immediate ways that the treaty was designed to avoid --
the need to fight a war.
Within this framework, it would seem quite impossible
to demonstrate that a decision to terminate a treaty of
alliance would, in every case, constitute a step away from
war. For example, it would be sheer folly to suggest
that the dismantling of NATO or the Korean defense pact
would enhance the prospects for a stable peace in today's
world. This, in turn, is quite sufficient to put at
rest any simplistic notion that the termination of an
alliance is different in its portent of war from the making
of an alliance.
But reality requires that we go a step further. One can
readily posit a series of changes in the politico-military
164. For the notion that treaty terminations "disentangle" the
United States from other nations' affairs, see L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs
and the Constitution 169 (1972).
218 [VOL. 6
POWER TO TERMINATE TREATIES
structure of the world in the light of which a dis-
mantling of NATO would be a positive step towards peace.
One can also concede that Presidents are unlikely to
propose the termination of any alliance except in the
context of such changes. Indeed, cases could occur
in which there could be no national dissent from the
conclusion that termination constituted a step away
from war. More likely, however, the tendencies and the
wisdom of terminating an alliance will be a matter for
rational debate involving a host of difficult questions.
The Taiwan situation is illustrative. One can
readily accept the fact that the normalization of re-
lations with Peking is in the interests of the United
States and that, by agreeing to normalization, Peking
has signaled a new, less belligerent posture toward
Taiwan. But there are other factors in the equation.
Peking continues to claim that Taiwan is part of China,
that the unification of China is a matter for the Chinese
alone to settle and it has pointedly refused to renounce
the use of force. 1 65 Nor can one ignore recent Chinese
history with its manifest propensities for sharp and
precipitous changes in policies toward the West. Surely
one must also consider the possibility of an enhanced
Chinese military capability resulting from expanded
trade and technological acquisitions from the United
States. In addition, the United States' interest in
the security of Taiwan has not materially diminished.
Standing astride the sea routes between Japan, Korea,
the Philippines, and Southeast Asia, the continued ex-
clusion of any hostile force from Taiwan remains critical
to the preservation of American power in the western
Pacific. We may also consider whether termination of
the treaty with Taiwan was essential to normalization or
whether a less precipitous move might have yielded a
better bargain. We may question whether the timing
was tied to the President's own domestic political
needs in a way that suggests the importance of Congress
as a counterweight for the benefit of the nation.
In short, it matters not how one ultimately judges
the wisdom of the President's decision. What matters
is that it was a grave and far-reaching decision on
which rational debate was not only possible but of
potentially immense value to the nation. It is beyond
165. Statement of the Government of the Peoples Republic of
China, January 1, 1979, 18 ILM 274 (1979).
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dispute that if the President has miscalculated, the
United States will face some agonizing decisions
which will not fall to the President alone to make.
Certainly Congress was sensitive to this point when
it substantially rewrote the President's proposed
Taiwan Relations Act to reaffirm America's commit-
ment to the security of Taiwan,1 66 an opportunity not
likely to attend the termination of other alliances.
What is true of the Taiwan case is more than likely
to be true of our other alliances: a proposed change in
direction born of hope but tempered with grave un-
certainties, an opportunity fraught with danger and
with mixed signals from an erstwhile adversary un-
doubtedly suffering its own ambivalence. In such a
setting, the wisdom of the Madisonian conception of the
separation of powers doctrine becomes apparent. These
are matters of such grave import that if the idea of
checks and balances is to operate at all, it must op-
erate on such occasions.
More rigorously, the same conclusion follows from
our general design of the President's foreign relations
powers. Later, in the context of the historical record,
we deal, arguendo, with the case where the President's
interstitial authority might be brought to bear.16 7 But
that is a very special and distinguishable case. More
generally, the higher order of legitimacy that attaches
to the concurrent will of the President and two-thirds
of the Senate, and renders the President powerless to
ignore or override that will, necessarily renders him
powerless to reassess either the strategic assumptions
upon which that will was predicated or the wisdom of
risking the strategic dangers assumed, should he then
attempt to act on the basis of his reassessment. He
cannot be excused from his duty of obedience to the
treaty-makers merely because he thinks that circum-
stances have out-run their assumptions. Otherwise the
rule of obedience would be pointless.
The termination of a treaty of alliance, including
a Mutual Defense Treaty,is, in sum, a special case. It
impinges directly upon Congress' war powers. Consequently,
the separation of powers doctrine, reinforced by political
166. Compare S. 245, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (the Executive
Branch's proposed bill) with the Taiwan Relations Act.
167. See note 189 infra and accompanying text.
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reality, commands that the President be barred from
terminating any such treaty without obtaining the
concurrence of either two-thirds of the Senate or a
majority of both houses of Congress, the latter be-
cause, on this subject, the statute-makers can always
override the treaty-makers.
1 68
168. While it may be that, theoretically, there are subjects upon
which Congress may not legislate but to which the treaty power extends
(ef. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)),that is certainly not so
with regard to treaties of alliance. See generalZl, L. Henkin, Foreign
Affairs and the Constitution 145 (1972).
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V
THE HISTORICAL RECORD:
A JUDICIAL & HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PAST PRECEDENT
In the debates over our subject, much has been made
of the fact that Presidents have, in the past, terminated
treaties on their own initiative without objection from
either Senate or Congress. The State Department argues
that there have been twelve cases in our history in
which a President has "acted alone." 169 Whether 170
this accurately describes the historical record or not,
the Department's effort to use these cases as support
for President Carter's decision cannot withstand close
scrutiny.
In examining these cases, we are not without
judicial assistance. Although few in number, there
are some notable decisions which take on increased
significance when read in conjunction with our broader
design of the presidential powers. Indeed, they fit
that design very nicely. With this guidance we conclude
that in nine of the cases reviewed the President's actions
were firmly predicated upon his duty to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed." In one of the remain-
ing cases, the President failed to act on his decision.
This instance we can ignore. 1 71 In the last two cases,
the President acted in a foreign relations context
utterly unlike anything attending the Taiwan matter. In
sum, our examination will serve both to suggest that
President Carter has stepped far beyond the boundaries
of his power and to identify some of the implications
of his decision.
169. Affidavit of Arthur W. Rovine, Assistant Legal Adviser for
Treaty Affairs, Department of State, filed in Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F.
Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1979).
170. See Thomas, The Abuse of Histoz: A Refutation of the State
Department Analysis of Alleged Instances of Independent Presidential
Treaty Termination, 6 Yale Stud. World Pub. Ord. at 25-27 (1979).
171. This was President Johnson's 1965 abortive notice of United
States withdrawal from the Warsaw Convention. In that instance the
President withdrew his notice before it had become effective.
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A lm line of authority, beginning with Ware v.
Hy ton, has established that, as a source of
domestic law, a statute takes precedence over a prior
inconsistent treaty and vice versa. This holds even
in situations where statutory obligation subsequently
imposed upon the executive and the judiciary results
in a breach by the United States of its international
obligations. But this need not occur. If, by the
text of the treaty or under customary international
law, the United States has the right to terminate a
treaty and avoid its breach, the opportunity obviously
exists for bringing the nation's international obli-
gations into conformity with domestic law. In principle,
at least, one might argue that the President, being
endowed with the instrumental powers for bringing this
reconciliation to pass is under a duty to to so. On
this point Van der Weyde v. Ocean Co.M 1 3 is instructive.
In 1915, Congress passed the Seamen's Act, expressing its
"judgment" that treaty provisions in conflict with the
act "ought to be terminated," adding that the President
was "requested and directed" to give foreign governments
notice to that effect. The President, invoking rights
reserved in the treaty text, initially gave notice
terminating the entire 1827 Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation with Norway, later agreeing with Norway to
terminate only the two clauses most affected by the
act. In response to the contention that this decision
exceeded the President's constitutional authority, the
Court concluded that, under the Take Care clause and
as "organ" of our relations with foreign governments,
it was "incumbent upon the President" to judge whether
any inconsistency existed between the law and the treaty
and to act accordingly. It then reviewed the exercise
of his discretion declaring it neither "arbitrary"
nor "inadmissible.,,1 74
It should be observed that Van der Weyde might be
thought to impose a "duty" on the President only in
the event of a prior express congressional directive.
This would mean, however, that, absent a directive, the
President could, at his discretion, place the United
States in the position of violating international law.
The interpretation is perverse. If Congress can put the
President under a constitutional obligation to terminate
172. 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
173. 297 U.s. 114 (1936).
174. Id. at 118.
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a prior inconsistent treaty, enactment of the statute
per se should suffice for that purpose.
The next instructive decision is Charlton V. KelZy 175
There the court rejected the argument that Charlton, a
United States citizen, could not be extradited to stand
trial in Italy because Italy, having refused to yield
up its own citizens to the United States, had breached
the extradition treaty relied on by the government.
Contrary to the United States' interpretation of the
word "persons" in the treaty, Italy had contended that,
while it was not required to hand over Italians to the
United States, the latter was required to give up
American citizens to Italy. This apparent lack of
reciprocity was justified by the fact that, under Italian
law, Italian courts could try Italians found in Italy
for crimes committeed anywhere in the world, while gen-
erally the United States courts could only try persons for
crimes committed in the United States. The seeming lack
of reciprocity was, the Italians said, wholly in keeping
with the essential purposes of the treaty: bringing
fugitives to justice. In response, the SecTetaTy of State
adhered to his Department's earlier interpretation and
asserted that Italy was in violation of the treaty. The
decision to surrender Charlton, however, was consistent
with the United States' conclusion that the treaty had
never been abrogated and that, until abrogation, the
United States was obligated to perform.
The Court did not accept this at face value. It
took pains to confirm that, under international law, breach
by one party only rendered a treaty "voidable" at the
instance of the other. It also observed that the treaty
was still of considerable value to the country. Yet the
American government could not have kept the treaty alive
by conceding Italy's interpretation. To have done so
would have had the "most serious consequences" for
five other treaties in which the same words appeared.1 76
The Secretary's solution was, therefore, an eminently
sensible one, well within Executive discretion. The
government would continue to declare Italy in violation,
but would then "waive" its right to be free of the treaty.
This grant of discretion to the President to act as
best fits the policies and objectives of a treaty suggests
a certain broadening of the President's powers under Van
der Weyde. That case put the President under a duty to
175. 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
176. Id. at 468.
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terminate all treaties that are inconsistent with a later
enacted statute or treaty. Under Chariton, the Presi-
dent possesses a discretion to "waive" a right of
termination if to do so was consonant with the broader
policies and objectives of a treaty. As a corollary,
it would seem that the President could terminate any
treaty, even one which was not facially inimical to a
later statute or treaty, if he found the earlier pact
to be inconsistent with the broader policies and ob-
jectives of the later enactment. This, of course, is
nothing but the teachings of the Steel Seizure
1 77
decision applied to treaty terminations. If, in further-
ance of the objectives expressed in the United Nations
Resolutions on the Korean War, the President could have
seized private property but for the fact that Congress
had deliberately denied him that power, then he could
terminate a treaty if termination was supported by the
policies and objectives of a later enacted statute. The
President might not have termination authority if
the record showed that Congress had deliberately con-
sidered and rejected termination as unnecessary to the
policy objectives of the subsequent statute. Looking at
the historical record, it seems fair to view six of the
twelve instances cited by the State Department as coming
within this rule:1 78 an aspect of the President's
177. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
178. President McKinley's termination in 1899 of the 1850 Con-
vention of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Switzerland was
tied to Swiss insistence upon an interpretation that was contrary to the
general policies expressed by Congress in a subsequent statute or was
expressly invalidated by that statute. President Wilson's termination
in 1920 of the 1891 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation with the
Belgian Congo was one of the terminations under the 1915 Seaman's Act,
which was interpreted by Van der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S.
114 (1936) as placing the President under a duty to act. President
Roosevelt's decision in 1933 to withdraw from the 1927 Convention for
the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions was
directly precipitated by passage of the National Recovery Act in 1933.
The State Department feared that, in exercising his powers under that
act, the President would be acting in direct violation of, or at least
contrary to the policies of, the convention. President Roosevelt's
1933 notice of termination (later withdrawn) of the 1931 Treaty of
Extradition with Greece was a direct response to the latter's alleged
breach when it refused to extradite Samuel Insull. This termination
falls squarely within the boundaries set in Chaxlton v. Kelly. Presi-
dent Roosevelt's agreement with Italy in 1936 to terminate the 1871
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was for the purpose of gaining the
freedom to take action under the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act without violating the treaty. Finally, President Kennedy's decision
in 1962 to terminate the 1902 Convention on Commercial Relations with
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duty to "take Care" that the laws be faithfully executed.
When we move to cases in which there is no later
expression of the statute- or treaty-makers' will, the
President's power to act on his own initiative is, under
our basic design, dependent upon the absence of any
expression of policy by the statute- or treaty-makers
on the subject of the President's decision. Since
the treaty stands as a formal expression of that will,
the requirement of legislative "silence" can be met only
if new circumstances have arisen which lie beyond the
control of either President or Congress and are so in-
compatible with the treaty regime that one can presume
that the treaty-makers would not have proceeded with the
treaty had those circumstances been anticipated. The
new circumstances must create a situation which can be
likened to one in which no treaty or stitute exists and,
hence, in which the President can act independentty (i.e.,
terminate or continue the treaty) under his interstitial
powers. The resulting rule would be somewhat comparable
to the international law rule of rebus sic stantibus.
As with that rule, the difficulty lies in defining the
case. Fortunately, however, we can obtain guidance from
the courts.
In XerLinden V. Ames, 1 79 petitioner upon habeas
corpus challenged his proposed extradition to Germany
under a 1852 Treaty with the Kingdom of Prussia. He
contended that because Prussia had been absorbed into
the German Empire and no longer existed, the treaty had
been automatically abrogated and could not serve as a
predicate for his extradition.
The Court rejected the argument although it admitted
that, under proper circumstances, the absorption of one
state by another could result in the abrogation of all
treaties made by the absorbed state. Such was the case
with Hanover and Nassau which had become incorporated
into the Kingdom of Prussia after their conquest in
1866. In such a case neither the courts nor the Executive
would have any discretion to consider the treaty obligatory
178. (continued)
Cuba and establish a trade embargo relied on several statute&, includ-
ing the Tariff Classification Act of 1962. By this latter Act,
Congress authorized the suspension of tariff preferences for Cuba
and expressly suspended two statutes that had been passed partly to
implement the 1902 Treaty.
179. 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
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upon the United States. That, however, was not the
case with Prussia. The Court examined the German
constitution, noted the representations of the German
Government itself, and reviewed the practices of other
states and of the United States in dealing with Germany.
It concluded from this that the case was such that
"whether power remain[ed] in a foreign state to carry
out its treaty obligations" was an issue for the
Executive to decide in the exercise of an informed
discretion. 180
In terms of our basic analytic design, it would
seem that if the foreign party to a treaty had ceased
to exist as an independent sovereign state, the via-
bility of the treaty regime would present, by definition,
a new question notwithin the original contemplation of
the treaty-makers. If international law would consider
the treaty automatically abrogated, then presumably the
President as "organ" of the Nation, and obligated by
the Take Care clause, would be bound to take whatever
steps were necessary to conform the technical legal
situation of the United States to this reality. 1 8 1
But, as Terlinden illustrates, given the varieties
of changes that can occur in the status of governments,
there must necessarily be an area of executive dis-
cretion to preserve or terminate a treaty. The standard
is whether power remains in a foreign state to carry
out its treaty obligations; whether, in other words, the
treaty regime continues to be a viable instrument for
carrying out the objectives that the treaty-makers
originally had in mind. 182 This being the standard, any
executive judgment envincing a rational evaluation of
the facts would constitute a judgment resting squarely
upon the Take Care clause. Moreover, if this is the
standard, it is not difficult to conceive of cases, other
than a treaty partner's loss of independence, which
could raise a comparable issue. Three of the State
Department's cases illustrate the point.
In 1954, President Eisenhower withdrew the United
180. Id. at 288.
181. Cf. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
182. For an analysis of the effect of derecognition on the
continued existence of Taiwan as a viable government for carrying out
treaty obligations, see Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as
Applied to the United States Recognition of the Republic of China,
19 Harv. Intl. L.J. 931, 944-967 (1978).
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States from the 1923 Convention on the Uniformity
of Nomenclature for the Classification of Merchandise
(the so-called Brussels! nomenclature). The outdated
treaty regime was collapsing, if it had not already done
so. Four years earlier the United Nations Economic and
Social Council had urged nations to adopt an alternative
system. The Organization of American States had taken a
similar position and the United States action coincided
with similar actions by a number of other countries. The
same is true of President Roosevelt's denunciation in
1944 of the 1929 Protocol to the Inter-American Convention
for Trademark and Commercial Protection. Apparently the
Protocol had never been, and was unlikely to become, a
viable regime. Finally, while there is some evidence
of an earlier effort at termination by President Madison
which was subsequently repudiated by President Monroe,
the State Department in 1872 informed the Dutch Minister
that the 1782 Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the
Netherlands was no longer binding on the parties. In
1889 it listed the treaty among those "with Powers that
had been absorbed into other nationalities."
1 -3
Before turning to the State Department's last two
examples of presidential treaty termination, it is
instructive to note a test, very comparable to that
being developed here, that the courts have used in de-
ciding whether to declare treaties abrogated or suspended
by supervening war. In Clark v. Allen,1 84 the Court
adopted Justice Cardozo's classic statement1 S5 of the rule.
It was for the courts, Justice Cardozo said:
...to determine whether, alone, or by
force of connection with an inseparable
scheme, the [treaty] provision is in-
consistent with the policy or safety
of the nation in the emergency of war,
and hence presumably intended to be
183. For general discussion on these three terminations, see the
relevant sections in Thomas, note 173 supra and:
1. "President's Power to Give Notice of Termination of
US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty," memorandum from Herbert J.
Hansell, State Department Legal Adviser to the Secretary
of State, December 15, 1978, reprinted in Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. 2d. Sess., Termination of
Treaties: The Constitutional Allocation of Power (Comm.
Print 1978) 419-20 (Eisenhower).
2. 11 Dep't State Bull. 442 (1944) (Roosevelt).
3. [1873] Foreign Relations of the United States, pt. 2 at 721
(Madison).
184. 331 U.S. 403 (1947).
185. See Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185, cert. denied.
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limited to time of peace. 186
The standard appears as apt for the executive as for the
courts: Has an event occurred which is sufficiently
incompatible with the treaty-makers' purposes that one
can reasonably presume that they would not have intended
the treaty to continue once the event occurred? There
is, however, a difference, between the test when applied
to the Executive and when applied to the courts. If it
is concluded that the treaty-makers would not have pro-
ceeded under the new circumstance, the judiciary has no
alternative but to terminate the treaty Ci.e., the courts
must then advert to a statute or to the common law for
their rule of decision). In the case of the Executive,
however, it is certainly arguable that such a conclusion
merely triggers the President's independent policy-making
powers. It may be likened to a situation in which there
is no treaty or statute. The President is free to act
with legal effect, either to terminate or continue the
treaty regime, provided that his decision is based upon
one of his enumerated powers, including the protective
function of the Take Care clause.
With this test in mind, we turn to the first of the
State Department's remaining cases. In 1927, President
Coolidge terminated the 1925 Convention on the Preven-
tion of Smuggling with Mexico. The action was taken in
the context of rapidly deteriorating relationship between
Mexico and the United States. There had been expro-
priations of American property and alleged mistreatment
of American citizens. Moreover, according to the Presi-
dent, the Mexicans were supplying arms to Nicaraguan
insurgents in spite of the repeated American requests
that such sales be stopped. Three months before his
decision to terminate the treaty, the President had
proclaimed an embargo on all arms shipments to Mexico.
One might treat this instance as an extension
of the rule in Terlinden V, Ame.s. The manifest inability
or unwillingness of the treaty-partner to control else-
where the kind of behavior (smuggling) that the treaty
was designed to control might be considered to sustain
a conclusion that the partner was incapable of fulfilling
its obligations and that the treaty regime was not viable.
We prefer to analyze the case differently, treating this
reasoning as relevant but not decisive.
185. (Continued)
254 U.S. 643 (1920).
186. 331 U.S. at 509-10.
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The second case was President Roosevelt's decision
in 1939 to terminate the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation with Japan. Japan had violated the 1920
Nine Power Agreement to respect the territorial in-
tegrity of China, had sunk the United States gunboat,
Panay, had repudiated the Kellogg-Briand Pact and had
withdarawn from the 1921 Washington Naval Limitations
Agreement. Pressure was building in the United States
for an embargo and other economic sanctions against
Japan. To that point, however, the President had re-
quested only that private firms take voluntary measures.
There was pending in both Houses a joint resolution
calling for termination of the 1911 treaty, with some
members arguing that the United States was bound to take
that step under the 1922 Nine Power Agreement. Never-
theless, no action had been taken on the resolution.
It is instructive to compare this last case with
President Kennedy's action in 1962 terminating the 1902
Convention on Commercial Relations with Cuba. In
both instances the treaty-partner, Japan and Cuba
respectively, had violated its international obligations
toward the United States. Each was engaged in activities
in third countries which the United States considered
aggressive and contrary to its interests. Each con-
stituted a hostile and disruptive force, in an area of
the world deemed vital to the United Statest own security.
As Judge Friendly said, in upholding the Cuban-Assets
Control Regulations1 8 7 against a Fifth Amendment attack:
"We are not formally at war with Cuba but only in a
technical sense are we at peace' 1 88 If our relations
with Japan had not deteriorated as far as had those with
Cuba, they were quickly doing so. Certainly, in both
cases the climate of relations and the resulting ex-
pectations regarding the course of those relations was
wholly different from what had prevailed when the treaties
were made.
Yet, there is an important difference. President
Kennedy acted strictly in keeping with policies embodied
in newly enacted statutes and in keeping with other
statutorily authorized actions. Those measures had
already rendered the treaty virtually inoperable and its
termination a mere technicality. President Roosevelt acted
without any statutory warrant whatsoever and, in a
187. 31 C.F.R. § 515.101 (1963).
188. Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F. 2d 106, 111 (2d Cir.
1966).
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technical sense, the 1911 Treaty with Japan was
completely viable. The latter case, in other words,
stood at the very borderline of presidential power.
Yet, it would seem to have met Justice Cardozo's test
as set forth in Clark v. Allen. In the face of the
circumstances that attended the termination, would
the treaty-makers have contemplated its continuance
or not? The answer seems clear. Under the cir-
cumstances of 1939, neither the treaty-makers of
1911 nor those of 1939 would have seriously contemplated
extending or continuing commercial privileges, es-
pecially most-favored-nation treatment, to Japan. In
view of Mexico's manifestly unreliable enforcement,
the same basic conclusion can be reached with regard
to the smuggling treaty.
In contrast, no such answer can be given with
regard to the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. The
Taiwan government had not violated any of its treaty
obligations toward the United States. It had not acted
in anything but the friendliest manner toward this
country and its vital interests. It had remained a
staunch ally. As already noted, the threat to Taiwan's
security had not disappeared with our recognition of the
Peking government. The mutual defense agreement was
both viable and supportive of a broad range of American
interests in the area. What then had changed? An impor-
tant new opportunity had opened up for improving re-
lations between the United States and a government hostile
to the Taiwan regime. This improvement promised sub-
stantial advantages to the United States. The climate
of opinion in this country was disposed, even strongly
disposed, to put past hostilities aside and exploit
those advantages. At the same time, this opportunity
was not without its dangers for the United States.
Peking's continued claim to Taiwan, its refusal to re-
nounce the use of force, and its history of precipitous
political change could not be ignored.
Could one then presume, using Justice Cardozot s
test, that under these circumstances the treaty-makers
would have refused to continue the defense treaty? A
negative answer seems clear. What they might have in-
tended is sufficiently in doubt that no presumption could
be ascribed to them. Reformulated according to our test,
can this situation be likened to one in which no treaty
or statute existed? Again the level of uncertainty
necessitates a negative answer. The United States
faced a situation calling for the exercise of a del-
icate judgment, a judgment pertaining to a matter of
grave importance upon which there was ample time to de-
liberate.
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Also, it must be remembered that, unlike Presidents
Coolidge and Roosevelt, President Carter was dealing
with a treaty of alliance. His decision impinged di-
rectly upon Congress' war powers, a subject -- emergencies
aside -- upon which he generally possesses no indepen-
dent power whatsoever. 1 9 Nevertheless, even if one
concedes, arguendo, as an exception to this rule, that
the President may possess a power to terminate an alliance
where new circumstances warrant ascribing to the treaty-
makers a presumptive intent to abandon the treaty al-
together, the fact of its being an exception requires
that the test be rigorously applied. If rigorously applied,
the conclusion is plain. That President Carter's action
could not even qualify under the test as applied in the
far less rigorous context of a commercial or smuggling
treaty only underscores how far he actually strayed be-
yond anything sanctioned by the practice of the last two
hundred years. His action was unprecddented and un-
warranted.
Lastly, there remains the question of whether the
close relationship between the termination of the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the decision to recognize the Peking
regime restores the President's action to the ambit of
his powers because the recognition power is exclusively
his . 90 United States v. Pinkl9l would seem to supply
a definitive answer. In that case, it was contended
that the United States' receipt of certain funds
assigned to it by the Soviet Government (the Litvinov
assignments) would violate petitioner's Fifth Amend-
ment rights. In responding, the Court acknowledged that
the President's recognition power encompassed a "power
to determine the policy which is to govern the question
of recognition"1 97 and that the Litvinov assignment, as
a way of removing the obstacles to the recognition of the
Soviets, was a modest implied power of the President.
Hence, the Executive's declaration that the assignments
189. Se text following note 163 supra.
190. Technically, the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan
constituted no barrier whatsoever to the exercise of the President's
recognition power. The President could have unilaterally recognized
the Peking regime. It was his policy of seeking mutual recognition
that made it possible for the Peking regime to demand termination
of the Taiwan treaty.
191. 315 U.S. 204 (1942).
192. Id. at 229.
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were necessary to the recognition decision was "final
and conclusive"1 93 on the Court. This did not, however,
leave the Court powerless to judge the constitutionality
of the assignments. To the contrary, it judged and up-
held their validity.
The parallel is suggestive. It is within the
function of the courts to judge whether the Executive
has conformed to the Constitution. Their competence,
however, does not extend to judging the President's
decision to recognize a foreign government. On the
other hand, it does extend to judging executive agree-
ments, such as the Litvinov assignments, if not tied to
an exercise of the recognition power. The question,
therefore, is whether tying the two together precludes
the courts from exercising their function with respect
to agreements. The answer from Pink was clearly no.
In a similar vein, Congress is not competent to
judge the President's decision to recognize a foreign
regime. Yet, if, apart from such a decision, Congress
has the power to decide upon the termination of a
particular treaty, then the question is the same as that
in Tink. Does the linkage established by the President
foreclose Congress from exercising its function? Surely
the answer must be the same: No. Checks and balances
govern the relationship between the President and Con-
gress as much as between the President and the courts.
Moreover, the fact that Pink involved a challenge
under the Bill of Rights does not distinguish it from
the treaty termination case. That difference is largely
attributable to the functional difference between Congress
and courts.
More importantly, unless the results reached in
Pink are extended to the relationship between Congress
and President, the consequences would be wholly at odds
with the basic scheme of the Constitution. Consider
any situation in which the President possesses an in-
dependent power to make policy such as stationing troops
abroad, settling international claims or,. more generally,
protecting American rights under international law. It
would be unthinkable if every time he was called upon
to enter into negotiations with a foreign government on
such matters, he could accede to the latter's demand for
the termination of a treaty with a third country and,
193. Id. at 230.
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in so doing, preclude Congress from exercising any
judgment on the question whatsoever. If he could
do this, might he not agree to repeal statutes as
well? The notion is fundmentally at odds with the
system of checks and balances. It is the "inherent"
powers theory coming in through the back door.
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CONCLUSION
In the end, having performed the legal analysis,
what is the case for the President all about? Mani-
festly, it is.not about efficacy in the conduct of
foreign relations. Woven into the fabric of con-
stitutional judgment -- in the concepts, the balancing,
the lawyers' subtle logic -- is a concern for efficacy.
And judged by lawyers' logic, the President's case
utterly fails. To insist nonetheless that efficacy is
still at issue, is to say something very different.
It is to say that the Constitution is unworkable, that
it is not fit for the modern world. But that is also
to say that we cannot remain a free people.
One cannot he unmindful of the towerint figures
of Lincoln, Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt who, moved
by their own vision of things, boldly took all the
power that necessity seemed to dictate and earned the
plaudits of history and a grateful people for doing
so. Presidents will act; perhaps even in spite of
themselves. They will do whatever necessity warrants,
trusting to history and the people for their vindication.
And it must always be that way. They must always be
denied the legitimating influence of the Constitution.
In assaying necessity, they must always know that if
history and the people turn on them, there is nothing
for them but the awesome prospect of impeachment; no
protecting cloak of constitutional legitimacy. Were
it not so -- were they able to find warrant in some
broad "inherent" constitutional power to act upon their
own vision -- then every policy preference would become
a national necessity, every instrument of governmental
action a weapon of necessity and every opponent an
enemy of the state. And there would be no liberty left
to us.
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